Predicate Offenses for First Degree
Felony Murder in Virginia by Holcomb, Richard Brooks
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 2 Article 8
Spring 3-1-2000
Predicate Offenses for First Degree Felony Murder
in Virginia
Richard Brooks Holcomb
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Brooks Holcomb, Predicate Offenses for First Degree Felony Murder in Virginia, 57 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 561 (2000), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol57/iss2/8
Predicate Offenses for First Degree
Felony Murder in Virginia
Richard Brooks Holcomb*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ............ ..................... 563
A. Section 18.2-32 and the Predicate Offenses ........... 565
B. The Cross-Reference to Section 18.2-31 .............. 568
C. Implications of the Problem ....................... 569
II. Felony Murder: The Doctrine ......................... 571
A. Felony Murder at Common Law .................... 571
B. Felony Murder in Virginia ........................ 572
III. Predicate Offenses in Section 18.2-32 ................... 573
A. The Sex Offenses ............................... 573
1. Rape: Section 18.2-61 ........................ 574
2. Sodomy and Object Sexual Penetration:
Sections 18.2-67.1 and 18.2-67.2 ................ 575
3. Intransigent Interpretive and Doctrinal Issues ....... 576
B. Robbery ...................................... 578
1. Common-Law Robbery: Section 18.2-58 .......... 579
2. Carjacking: Section 18.2-58.1 .................. 580
3. Proper Predicates for Section 18.2-32 Robbery ...... 581
C. Arson ........................................ 583
1. Common-Law Arson ......................... 584
2. Arson inthe Code ............................ 585
* The author would like to thank Professor Roger D. Groot for assisting in the develop-
ment of this Note and for the indispensable aid of his book, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in
Virginia. This Note was also completed with the support and critical acumen of Mary Beth
Holcomb. For Cecil Brooks Holcomb, Jr. and Cecil Brooks Holcomb Ill.
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 561 (2000)
a. Dwelling Places: Section 18.2-77 ............. 585
b. The Meeting House: Public Buildings
and Section 18.2-79 ....................... 587
c. Other Structures: Sections 18.2-80 and
18.2-82 ................................ 588
d. Nonstructural Burnings: Sections 18.2-81,
18.2-86, 18.2-87, and 18.2-88 ............... 589
(1) Property and Crops .................... 589
(2) Setting the Woods on Fire ................ 590
3. Proper Predicates for Section 18.2-32 Arson ........ 591
a. Dwelling Structures ....................... 592
b. Penalty Structure ......................... 593
c. Textual Structure ......................... 594
D. Burglary ...................................... 595
1. Common-Law Burglary ....................... 595
2. Burglary in the Code ......................... 596
a. Statutory Burglary Section 18.2-89 .......... 596
b. Housebreaking or Storebreaking:
Sections 18.2-90 and 18.2-91 ................ 596
3. Proper Predicates for Section 18.2-32 Burglary ...... 598
E. Abduction ..................................... 599
1. Common-Law Abduction and Kidnapping .......... 600
2. Abduction in the Code ........................ 601
a. Simple Abduction: Section 18.2-47 ........... 601
b. Aggravated Abduction: Section 18.2-48 ........ 602
c. Parental Abduction: Section 18.2-49.1 ......... 604
3. Proper Predicates for Section 18.2-32 Abduction .... 604
a. History of the Cross-Reference to
Section 18.2-31 .......................... 604
b. Penalty Structure ......................... 606
IV. Conclusion ....................................... 608
FIRST DEGREE MURDER PREDICATE OFFENSES IN VIRGJNIA 563
The supreme excellency ofacode of criminal laws consists in defin-
ing every act that is punishable with such certainty and accuracy,
that no man shall be exposed to the danger of incurring a penalty
withoutknowing it, and which shall not give to courts anincalcula-
ble latitude of construction, withrespectto the conduct of mankind,
and an unbounded discretion in punishment.'
_ Zepheniah Swift
Throughout Western history, obeying the law has depended on the
interpretation of statutes ....'
- William N. Eskridge, Jr.
I. Introduction
The Virginia Code's indeterminant definition of first degree felony
murder3 is in serious need of revision. The statute, § 18.2-32, provides:
Murder, otherthan capital murder, bypoison, lyinginwait, imprisonment
starving, or by any willful, dehoerate, and premeditated killing, or in the
commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inani-
mate or animate object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction,
except as provided in § 18.2-3 1, is murder of the first degree, punishable
as a Class 2 felony.4
The numerous amendments made over the years to the first degree murder
statute, the capital murder statute, and related chapters and articles inthe Code
have combined to produce an unfortunate statutory tangle.5 Inconsistency
1. 2 ZEPHENIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF TE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 365
(1795).
2. WIUIAMN.EsKRDGEJR.,DYNAMICSTATUTORYINTERPRETATION1 (1994);seeLon
L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers in the Supreme Court of Newgarth, 4300, 62
HARv. L. REv. 616, 634 (1949) (discussing potential implications of view that interpreting
statutes may be compared to eating shoes, with best part being holes).
3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining first degree
murder).
4. Id.
5. See id. (listing amendments to first degree murder statute as "Code 1950, § 18.1-21;
1960, c. 358; 1962, c. 42; 1975, cc. 14, 15; 1976, c. 503; 1977, cc. 478, 492; 1981, c. 397;
1993, cc. 463, 490"). Notable amendments to the felony murder portion of the Code's first
degree murder statute include: the addition of abduction as a predicate offense in 1962, see
1962 Va. Acts ch. 42 (amending first degree murder statute to include abduction as predicate
offense for felony murder); the elimination of rape as a predicate in 1976, see 1976 Va. Acts ch.
503 (eliminating rape predicate); the reinstatement of rape as a predicate in 1977, see 1977 Va.
Acts ch. 478 (amending § 18.2-32 to include rape predicate); the addition of inanimate object
sexual penetration as a predicate in 1981, see 1981 Va. Acts ch. 397 (adding object sexual pene-
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within the text of § 18.2-32 and a series of incongruous intersections with
other relevant portions of the Code combine to defeat traditional methods of
statutory interpretation.6 Section 18.2-32's principal defect is the reference
system for the predicate offenses; the ambiguities in the statute create inter-
pretive problems that, under extreme readings, would allow Class 5 and Class
6 felonies and even misdemeanors to serve as predicate offenses for first
degree felony murder.' In its current form, Virginia's first degree felony
murder statute fails essential standards of statutory drafting for failing to
inform readers of the scope of first degree felony murder predicate offenses.'
This failure to inform the public of which crimes actually support a felony
murder charge undermines doctrinal justifications, such as deterrence, for
having a felony murder statute in the first instance.9 An ambiguous and
contradictory reference system also creates the possibility of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.1" In extreme cases, minor offenses inappropri-
ately prosecuted as predicates for first degree felony murder would result in
highly inequitable results."
tration predicate to § 18.2-32); and the amendment of the object sexual penetration predicate
to include animate objects in 1998, see 1998 Va. Acts ch. 281 (amending object sexual penetra-
tion predicate). Additional relevant amendments include: the addition of the offense of
caijacking in 1993 under the Article titled Robbery, see 1993 Va. Acts ch. 500 (defining offense
of cariseking); the expansion of the capital murder statute to include willful, deliberate and
premeditated killings in commission of robbery or in commission of or subsequent to rape, see
1976 Va. Acts ch. 503 (amending § 18.2-31 to include subsections (d) and (e)); and the expan-
sion of the capital murder statute to include an additional abduction subsection in 1985, see
1985 Va. Acts ch. 428 (amending to § 18.2-31 to include subsection (h)).
6. See VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.2-32 (listing statutory amendments relevant to § 18.2-32 and
felony murder predicates).
7. See id. §§ 18.2-10 & 18.2-11 (establishing penalty structures for felonies and mis-
demeanors). It is the position of this Note that Class 5 and 6 felonies, which are punishable, at
the judge or jury's discretion, by terms of imprisonment less than a year, are questionable
predicates for first degree felony murder. Id.; see infra note 62 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing felony murder rule and doctrinal limitation of rule to violent and inherently dangerous
offenses); infra Parts BLB.3, I.C.3.b, lfl.D.3, IILE.3 (discussing penalty structures as indicia
for proper predicates for first degree felony murder).
8. See Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 7,16,402 S.E.2d 229,234 (1991) (noting
that penal statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment if it fails to define offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement" (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983))).
9. See infra Part II (discussing felony murder doctrine).
10, See Perkins, 402 S.E.2d at 234 (noting unconstitutionally vague statute can encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement).
11. See infra note 38 (discussing parental abduction in violation of custody decree as
predicate for first degree felony murder as example of inappropriate application of § 18.2-32's
abduction predicate, § 18.2-49.1).
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A. Section 18.2-32 and the Predicate Offenses
Virginia divides first degree murder into three distinct categories: killings
committed by specific means; willful, deliberate, and premeditated killings;
and felony murder.12 Section 18.2-32 describes felony murder by predicate
offense: arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate or animate object sexual
penetration, robbery, burglary, and abduction. 3 However, § 18.2-32 does not
reference these predicate offenses by their statutory section number in the
Code. 4
This treatment of the predicate offenses requires prosecutors and courts
to make determinations about the appropriate statutory reference for each
felony murder predicate.15 In several instances the references are clear. 6 For
example, the predicate offense of rape correlates directly with § 18.2-61,
which is tifled "Rape."17 Although there are other offenses within the Article
titled "Criminal Sexual Assault," § 18.2-32 clearly refers to § 18.2-61 when
it names rape as a predicate offense for first degree felony murder. 8 The
reference is clear for the predicate offense of forcible sodomy as well, codi-
fied at § 18.2-67.1 as "Forcible Sodomy." Inanimate or animate object sexual
penetration, codified at § 18.2-67.2 as "Object Sexual Penetration," is also
readily ascertainable. 9
In many instances, however, the intended reference is not clear.20 Cur-
rently Title 18.2, Chapter 4, Article 5, titled "Robbery," contains two offenses:
§§ 18.2-58 and 18.2-58.1. Section 18.2-58, denominated "How punished,"
lists a variety of actions that establish the violence or intimidation element of
robbery and sets the penalty for the offense.2 In 1993, the General Assembly
12. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (Michie
1996 & Supp. 1999), first degree murder statute).
13. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing predicates for felony murder).
14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing predicates for felony murder).
15. See infra Part IIA3 (discussing, in context of rape predicate, charging decisions
implicated by felony murder doctrine).
16. See ROGERD. GROOT, CRIMINAL OFFENSES AM, DEFENSES IN VIRGNIA 273 (4th ed.
1998) (stating "[t]here is no difficulty in identifying the three sexual offenses; the references are
clearly to violations of §§ 18.2-61, 18.2-67.1, and 18.2-67.2"); see also infra Part Ill (examin-
ing sex offense predicates).
17. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining offense ofrape).
18. See id. tit. 18.2, ch. 4, art. 7 (listing statutory offenses under Article 7, entitled
"Criminal Sexual Assault").
19. See id. §§ 18.2-67.1, 18.2-67.2 (defining sex offenses of forcible sodomy and object
sexual penetration).
20. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (noting ambiguity in felony murder portion of first
degree murder statute).
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58 (defining punishment for robbery). In Virginia, the
Code does not define robbery, it is a common-law crime. See George v. Commonwealth, 242
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added § 18.2-58.1 to Article 5.22 This new section defines carijacking, in part
by restating the violence or intimidation portion of the robbery statute.23 As
it now reads, § 18.2-32's listing of robbery as a predicate offense to first
degree felony murder may be read simply as referring to § 18.2-58, titled
"How punished," or to the whole of Article 5, titled "Robbery." If the latter
interpretation is correct, carjacking becomes a predicate for first degree felony
murder even though § 18.2-32 does not list it as a predicate offense. 4
Section 18.2-32's reference to arson is more problematic. Chapter 5 of
Title 18.2, "Crimes Against Property," includes a series of burning crimes,
none of which contain the common-law definition of arson.2 Although § 18.2-
77, "Burning or destroying dwelling house, etc." most closely approximates
common-law arson, §§ 18.2-79 and 18.2-80 also deal specifically with the
burning of structures.2 6 Further confounding § 18.2-32's reference to arson is
the title of the article that contains the burning offenses - "Arson and Related
Crimes.127 Because § 18.2-32 cannot refer to a specific statutoryprovisionnor
to a specific criminal offense titled arson, the reference might be to the whole
of Article 1. In that event, the predicate offense of arson encompasses even the
Va. 264, 277, 411 S.E.2d 12, 20 (1991) ("Although the punishment for robbery is fixed by
statute, Code § 182-58, the offense is not statutorily defined, and we must look to the common
law for its definition.").
22. See 1993 Va. Acts ch. 500 (adding § 18.2-58.1 to criminal code).
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58.1 (Mlihie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining offense of
caiacking). Section 18.2-58.1 reads, in pertinent part
B. As used in this section, 'carijacking' means the intentional seizure or seizure of
control of a motor vehicle of another with intent to permanently or temporarily
deprive another in possession or control of the vehicle of that possession or control
by means of partial strangulation, or suffocation, or by striking or beating, or by
other violence to the person, or by assault or otherwise putting a person in fear of
serious bodily harm, or by the threat or presenting of firearms, or other deadly
weapon or instrumentality whatsoever.
Id.
24. See infra Part ]I.B.3 (discussing appropriateness of caijacking as felony murder
predicate).
25. See VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-77 (burning or destroying dwelling house, etc.); id. § 18.2-
79 (burning or destroying meeting house, etc.); id. § 18.2-80 (burning or destroying any other
building or structure); id. § 18.2-81 (burning or destroying personal property, standing grain,
etc.); id. § 18.2-82 (burning building or structure while in such building or structure with intent
to commit felony); id. § 18.2-86 (setting fire to woods, fences, grass, etc.); id. § 18.2-87 (setting
woods, etc., on fire intentionally whereby another is damaged or jeopardized); id. § 18.2-88
(carelessly damaging property by fire).
26. See id. §§ 18.2-77, 18.2-79, 18.2-80 (defining burning offenses); infra Part 11.C
(examining arson predicate for felony murder).
27. See VA. CODE ANN. tit 18.2, ch. 5, art. I (listing statutory offenses under Article 1,
titled "Arson and Related Crimes").
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negligent burning of brush and straw criminalized in § 18.2-88, a Class 4
misdemeanor.'
Perhaps the most troubling of the predicate offense problems within
§ 18.2-32 is the reference to abduction. First, Title 18.2, Chapter 4, Title 18.2,
denominated "Kidnapping and Related Offenses," contains at least three
abduction statutes, any one of which might be the offense referenced in § 18.2-
32.' Second, abduction is a statutory, not a common-law, offense." Third,
none of the statutory abduction offenses correlates with common-law kidnap-
ping.3" The first statutory offense is the general abduction statute, § 18.2-47.2
It is a Class 5 felony and does not import harm to the victim.3 Section 18.2-48,
the aggravated abduction statute, is a Class 2 felony.' It includes an additional
mental state, "the intentto extort money or for immoral purpose,"3 and encom-
passes ransom kidnapping, some forms of hostage taking, and juvenile white
slavery.36 Another statutory offense within Title 18.2, Chapter 4, Article 3
covers parental abduction in child custody cases. 7 Violation of this section is
28. See id. § 182-88 (defining statutory offense titled "Carelessly Damaging Property by
Fire").
29. See id. art. 3, §§ 18.2-47, 18.2-48, 18.2-49.1 (listing statutory offenses under Article
3, titled "Kidnapping and Related Offenses").
30. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (discussing history of abduction
offense).
31. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (Mlchie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining offense titled
"Abduction and Kidnapping Defined; Punishment"); GROOT, supra note 16, at 1 (stating that
while abduction and kidnapping are synonymous in Virginia, abduction offenses in Code are
"entirely statutory and virtually divorced from their common law antecedents").
32. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (defining general abduction offense).
33. See id. (defining offense as Class 5 felony, but providing different classification if
abductor is parent of victim); GROOT, supra note 16, at 274 (stating that § 18.2-47 "does not
import harm to the victim"). Section 18.2-47 also includes a provision for parental abduction,
which is chargeable as a Class I misdemeanor if the child is withheld from the custodial parent
within the Commonwealth, and a Class 6 felony if the child is withheld outside of the Common-
wealth. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (defining general abduction offense, including parental
abduction provision); infra Part JILE2.c (discussing parental abduction portion of general
abduction statute).
34. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-48 (defining aggravated abduction offense as Class 2
felony).
35. See id. (listing title as "Abduction with intent to extort money or for immoral purpose"
and providing that "Abduction (i) with intent to extort money or pecuniary benefit, (ii) of any
person with intent to defile such person, or (iii) of any child under sixteen years of age for the
purpose of concubinage or prostitution, shall be a Class 2 felony").
36. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 274 (stating that § 18.2-48 covers "ransom kidnapping,
some forms of hostage taking, and juvenile white slavery").
37. See VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-49.1 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining parental form
of abduction, titled "Violation of court order regarding custody and visitation").
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 561 (2000)
a Class 6 felony if the child is withheld from the custodial parent outside the
Commonwealth, but it is a misdemeanor offense under other circumstances.
38
The vagueness of § 18.2-32's reference to abduction as a predicate offense for
first degree felony murder is particularly troubling when its scope arguably
includes misdemeanor offenses. 9
B. The Cross-Reference to Section 18.2-31
Section 18.2-32's cross-reference to the capitalmurder statute, § 18.2-31,
adds an additional layer of complexity to the task of identifying felony murder
predicates." Following a listing of the predicate offenses, the language of
§ 18.2-32 reads "except as provided in § 18.2-31.' '  Facially, the exception
could apply to all three clauses of § 18.2-32 - the specific means, the willful
and deliberate, and the felony murder categories; to all the predicate offenses
to felony murder; or only to the predicate offense immediately preceding the
clause, abduction.
Although the statutory history supports this last and most narrow reading
of the capital murder cross-reference as the original understanding of the
General Assembly,42 subsequent amendments to the capital murder, the first
degree felony murder, and the abduction statutes have introduced considerable
ambiguity.43 Grammatically, the implication of the "except as" clause in
38. See id. (stating that under § 18.2-49.IA, when "child is withheld outside of the Com-
monwealth [the violator] shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony," but that under § 18.2-49.1B, if
person violates court order respecting custody, violator shall be guilty of Class 4 misdemeanor
if first offense; that second conviction for same offense within twelve months of first conviction
shall be Class 3 misdemeanor, and third conviction within twenty-four months of first convic-
tion shall be Class 2 misdemeanor); GROOT, supra note 16, at 4 (stating that § 18.2-49.1B
"contains the same elements as § 182-49.1A, except that the Commonwealth need not prove
that the child was withheld outside of Virginia").
39. See JosHtUADRESLERUNDERsTANDINGCRIMALLAW § 31.06B(3), at481 (2d ed.
1995) (stating felony murder rule "reflects society's judgment that the commission of a felony
resulting in death is more serious-and, therefore, deserves greater punishment-than the commis-
sion of a felony not resulting in death"); GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 ("Since the felony
murder doctrine imputes malice from predicate crime, it should be one in which the danger to
human life is inherently very probable.").
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (quoting first degree felony murder statute).
41. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (quoting first degree felony murder statute).
42. See infra Part 1LE3.a (discussing implication of cross-reference to capital murder
statute within first degree murder statute). As originally written, the 1975 version of § 18.2-31
included only one form of capital felony murder - the premeditated killing of any person in the
commission of abduction as defined in § 18.248, the Class 2 felony abduction statute. Neces-
sarily, the "except as provided in § 18.2-31" could have referred only to abduction.
43. See infra Part IUIE.3.a (discussing history of § 18.2-32's cross-reference to § 18.2-
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§ 18.2-32 indicates that whatever offenses § 18.2-31 delineates within the
capital murder category, those offenses are excepted from a larger pool of
possibilities contained within the first degree murder statute." However,
multiple constructions of both the size of the pool and the scope ofthe excep-
tion are currently permissible in Virginia.4"
C. Implications of the Problem
Although complete clarity in statutory drafting may be unattainable,
statutes that allow such a questionable latitude in construction are abhorrent to
our judicial system's ideas of fairness and notice.46 Also important is the
underlying theoretical premise that justifies a felony murder statute in the first
instance. The doctrine supposes that the predicate offense is of such a serious
nature that its very undertaking is inherently dangerous to human life and that
proof of the intent to commit the predicate offense abrogates the need for an
additional showing of some malice in the killing.47 At trial, the bad intent
44. For example, abduction is a predicate offense for both first degree and capital felony
murder. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31(1), 18.2-32 (Mlchie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (listing'
abduction among predicate offenses for capital and first degree felony murder). Accordingly,
when § 18.2-32 states "abduction, except as provided in § 18.2-31," one interpretation is that
§ 18.2-31, the capital statute, contains particularly egregious forms of abduction culled from the
larger group of abductions the first degree statute, § 18.2-32, references. Thus, § 18.2-31(1)
specifies the onerous forms of extortion, defilement, and drug offense abduction, and § 18.2-32
contains all other abductions. Id. This is the literal application of the "except as" language in
§ 18.2-32. However, this interpretation would include parental abductions in violation of
custody orders, as well as other forms, as predicates for first degree felony murder, and is
inconsistent with the historical treatment of abduction as a § 18.2-32 predicate offense and with
the doctrinal requirement that the predicate offense be inherently dangerous. See § 18.2-49.1
(criminalizing abduction in violation of court order regarding custody and visitation); infra Part
Mfl.E (examining predicate offense of abduction); infra Part II (discussing felony murder
doctrine). Parents in violation of a custody decree who experience the unintended, i.e. acciden-
tal, death of a child could be prosecuted for first degree felony murder. See infra Part ]fl.E
(examining predicate offense of abduction).
45. See infra Part III.E.3.a (discussing history of § 18.2-32's cross-reference to § 18.2-
31).
46. See Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 7, 16, 402 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1991)
(noting penal statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of Due Process Clause of Four-
teenth Amendment if it fails to define offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement" (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983))).
47. See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1981)
(explaining imputation of malice in felony murder doctrine); Regina v. Ser6, 16 Cox Crim.
Cas. 311 (Cent Crim. Ct. Va. 1887) (stating "any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely
in itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony which caused death, should
be murder"); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRiMINAL LAW
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intrinsic in the commission of one of the predicate felonies provides the malice
prerequisite to a finding that the homicide was murder. 8 However, if malice
cannot properly be inferred from the predicate offense because it is neither
egregious in its execution nor inherently dangerous in the abstract, the doc-
trinal justification is meritless.49
This Note maps the ambiguities and inconsistencies in Virginia's current
reference scheme for first degree felony murder. Part II reviews the felony
murder rule and its doctrinal justifications as they developed at common law,
and examines the doctrine as it exists in Virginia." Part I examines the
statutory offenses potentially cognizable as predicates for § 18.2-32 felony
murder by assessing potential predicates: for their fealty to common-law ante-
cedents; for their comportment with the felony murder rule's doctrinal re-
quirement of inherent dangerousness; and for the seriousness of the offenses,
using penalty structures as indicia of egregiousness." In so doing, Part III
determines whether the potential predicates are appropriately within the scope
of § 18.2-32 felony murder.52 In conclusion, Part IV recommends revisions
to § 18.2-32's reference system for first degree felony murder. 3
§ 7.5, at 208 (1986) (noting requirement that felony attempted or committed by defendant be
dangerous to human life limits scope of felony murder rule). In Wooden, the court stated:
"Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, or as
a result of ill will.... " Where a person maliciously engages in criminal activity,
such as robbery, and homicide of the victim results, the malice inherent in the
robbery provides the malice prerequisite to a finding that the homicide was murder.
Wooden, 284 S.E.2d at 814 (quoting Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 61, 41 S.E.2d
500,503 (1947)).
48. See I-Eckman v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 369,371,398 S.El.d 698,699 (1990)
(stating that where "person engages in felonious activity and homicide results, the malice
inherent in the original felony provides the malice necessary to a finding that the homicide was
murder").
49. See Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 408,411,404 S.E.2d 377,378-79 (1991)
(noting that in order to restrain felony murder from being rule of absolute liability, acts resulting
from commission of homicide must be consequence of felony, not mere coincidence); King v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351, 355, 368 S.E.2d 704, 706 (1988) (stating that in order for
unintended killing to fall within scope of felony murder rule, "the homicide must be criminal
in nature and must contain the elements or attributes of criminal homicide cognizable at
common law").
50. See infra Part H (discussing felony murder doctrine at common law and in Virginia).
51. See infra Part I (examining individual predicate offenses for first degree felony
murder).
52. See infra Part III (examining individual predicate offenses for first degree felony
murder).
53. See infra PartIV (recommending revisions to § 18.2-32's predicate offense reference
system).
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11. Felony Murder: The Doctrine
A. Felony Murder at Common Law
At common law, anyone who caused another's death in the course of
committing or attempting to commit a felony was guilty of murder.5 4 Over
time, the number of felonies increased to include some relatively minor
offenses. 5 Coordinately, the scope of the felony murder rule reached offenses
that were not dangerous to life or limb.56 English courts responded to this
expansion in the scope of the felony murder rule by imposing one of two
limitations. The first limitation required that the defendant's act be one of
violence and that the felony charged criminalize violent conduct. The second
required that the death be the natural and probable consequence of the defen-
dant's conduct in committing the felony.57
American courts have adopted several different limitations to alleviate the
harshness of the rule." Among the limitations are the requirements that the
conduct of the defendant be the proximate cause of death or that the felony
itself be dangerous to life. 9 Some states have limited the scope of the doctrine
by requiring that the predicate offense must have been a felony at common
law,' while others describe a general category of felonies to which the rule
applies.61 Most state criminal codes, like the Virginia Code, limit predicate
offenses to a list of specific felonies that are considered inherently dangerous.62
54. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 206-07 & nA (noting guilt was
"without regard to the dangerous nature of the felony involved or to the likelihood that death
might result from the defendant's manner of committing or attempting the felony," but that,
since "[alt the time the felony-murder rule developed, all felonies were punishable by death ...
it made little difference whether the felon was hanged for the felony or for the murder" (internal
citations omitted)).
55. See id. § 7.5, at 207 (noting felonies multiplied to include many offenses "which
involved no great danger to life or limb," giving examples of felonious sale of intoxicating
liquors and filing false tax returns).
56. See id. (noting expansion of felonies to include those not dangerous to life or limb).
57. See id. (stating that English courts limited the doctrine either "(1) by requiring that
the defendant's conduct in committing the felony involve an act of violence in carrying out a
felony of violence, or (2) by requiring that the death be the natural and probable consequence
of the defendant's conduct in committing the felony").
58. See id. § 7.5, at 207-08 (describing methods of limiting scope of felony murder rule).
59. See id. § 7.5, at 208 (describing methods of limiting scope of felony murder rule).
60. See id. (noting felonies at common law are rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary, arson,
mayhem, and larceny).
61. See id. § 7.5, at 210-11 (stating that "these categories in one way or another relate to
the dangerousness of the felony").
62. See id. § 7.5, at 211 & n.24 (noting that these specific felonies "involve a significant
prospect of violence" (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (1950))); see also ROIL.IN M. PERKINS,
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B. Felony Murder in Virginia
The Virginia Code does not define murder.6" Virginia's courts espouse
the traditional common-law formulation that a homicide is elevated to murder
if committed with malice.' The malice may be express or implied.6' In a
felony murder prosecution, the intention to commit the predicate offense
functions as the malice necessary to elevate a homicide to murder;" the killing
itself need not be intentional. 67
In order for malice to be implied, the act causing death must result from
an effort to further the felony; some act must be attributable to the felon that
causes death.6' This causation requirement is one of the major limitations
Virginia places on the felony murder doctrine.69 By way of statutory construc-
CRIMINAL LAW 43 (2d ed. 1969) (stating that if statute dealing with involuntary manslaughter
includes under that offense "any involuntary killing 'in the perpetration of or attempt to perpe-
trate any unlawful act other than arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem,' this shows a limita-
tion of the 'felony-murder rule' not only to a dangerous felony but to these particular five").
63. See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 761, 284 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1981)
("Since murder is not elsewhere defined in the code, murder for purposes of the felony-murder
statute is common-law murder coupled with the contemporaneous commission or attempted
commission of one of the listed felonies.").
64. See id. at 814 (stating "[t]he test of murder is malice" (quoting Jacobs v. Common-
wealth, 132 Va. 681,686, 111 S.E. 90, 92 (1922))).
65. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 265 (noting "Et]he cases adopt the common law defini-
tion: 'Murder is the unlawful killing of any person with malice aforethought and malice is
either express... or malice is implied... ."' (quoting M'Whirt's Case, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 594,
604-05 (1846)) (alteration in the original)).
66. See Wooden, 284 S.E.2d at 814 (stating "[w]here a person maliciously engages in
criminal activity, such as robbery, and homicide of the victim results, the malice inherent in the
robbery provides the malice prerequisite to a finding that the homicide was murder").
67. See id. (stating "[n]either premeditation nor an intent to kill is an element of felony-
murder, but malice is" (citing Robertson v. Commonwealth, I Va. Dec. 851, 856, 20 S.E. 362,
364 (1894))).
68. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (noting liability extends to one who was principal
in either first or second degree to predicate felony, although not actual slayer).
69. See Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 408, 411, 404 S.E2d 377, 378 (1991)
(stating "to limit the potentially harsh results of the felony-murder doctrine, Virginia courts
require the accidental death to be causally related to the commission of the felony"). However,
not all killings committed in the course of the predicate offenses are murders; in Virginia, felons
may not be convicted for the felony murder of co-felons killed by victims in the course of the
commission of one of the predicate offenses. See Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758,
765, 284 S.E.2d 811, 816 (1981) (holding that criminal participant in felony may not be
convicted of felony murder of co-felon killed by victim of initial felony). Rather than a
doctrinal or statutory limitation, Virginia's rule that there is no felony murder liability when the
killing is performed by one other than a criminal participant in the felony is a judge-made
limitation on the felony murder doctrine. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (noting limitation
on doctrine). In Wooden, the court noted that other states recognize a similar limitation on the
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tion, the predicate offenses themselves provide Virginia's other major limita-
tion on the felony murder doctrine by bounding the universe of underlying
crimes that may support a felony murder charge.7" For this reason, appropriate
implementation of the felony murder rule depends on an accurate interpreta-
tion of the scope of each predicate offense."'
IL1. Predicate Offenses in Section 18.2-32
A. The Sex Offenses
Section 18.2-32 lists three sex offenses that serve as predicates for felony
murder: rape, forcible sodomy, and inanimate or animate object sexual pene-
tration.72 Rape and sodomy were felonies at common law. 3 Object sexual
penetration extends the predicate sex offense category to include penetration
felony murder rule. Accord People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43 (Cal. 1975) (recognizing limitation
on felony murder rule); People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965) (same); Alvarez v.
Dist. Ct, 525 P.2d 1131 (Colo. 1974) (same); Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159 (Del. 1980)
(same); People v. Morris, 274 NE.2d 898 (Ill. 1971) (same); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209
N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1965) (same); People v. Austin, 120 N.W.3d 766 (Mich. 1963) (same);
Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766 (Nev. 1973) (same); State v. Canola, 374 A.2d
20 (N.J. 1977) (same); Jackson v. State, 589 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1979) (same); People v. Wood,
167 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1960) (same); Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1958)
(same); cf. In re Leon, 410 A.2d 121 (R.L 1980) (rejecting limitation on felony murder rule).
70. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-32 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (listing predicate offenses
for first degree felony murder). This limitation is true only of first degree felony murder,
however. The predicate offense requirement of § 18.2-33, the second degree felony homicide
statute, may be satisfied by any felonious act See id. § 18.2-33 (reading "[t]he killing of one
accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, while in the prosecution of some felonious
act other than those specified in §§ 18.2-31 and 182-32, is murder of the second degree and is
punishable as a Class 3 felony"); Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397,403,323 S.E.2d 90,
93 (1984) (noting that "commission of any felonious act... during the prosecution of which a
death occurs supplies the malice which raises the incidental homicide to the level of second-
degree murder" (emphasis added)). While the broad scope of § 18.2-33 is itself problematic, the
clear intention of the Code's structure is to differentiate the predicate offenses in § 18 2-32 from
the larger pool of possibilities in § 18.2-33. The separate listing and the difference in degree
underscores the conclusion that the predicates in § 18.2-32 are deemed particularly egregious
because of their inherently dangerous nature. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text
(discussing doctrinal limitations on felony murder rule). For a discussion of the problems with
the broadly worded second degree felony homicide statute, see LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 47,
§ 7.5, at 210-11 (noting problems with "all other forms" second degree felony homicide statutes).
71. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 208-10 (discussing methods of
limiting harshness of felony murder rule).
72. VA. CODE. ANN. § 182-32; supra Part 1.A (describing first degree felony murder
portion of statute).
73. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 208 (listing those potential predicate
offenses for felony murder which were felonies at common law: rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary,
arson, mayhem, and larceny).
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by object or animal. 4 Because of the specificity of the titles of the offenses,
both in § 18.2-32 and in their chapter in the Code, these three predicates are
easily identifiable.
1. Rape: Section 18.2-61
Section 18.2-61 is titled "Rape."'7" Contained within Article 7, Criminal
Sexual Assault, § 18.2-61 is the analog to common-law rape." These two
facts make § 18.2-61 the clear reference for § 18.2-32's rape predicate for first
degree felony murder.
74. See Bell v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 93, 98-99,468 S.E.2d 114, 116-17 (1996)
(noting statute makes it crime to sexually penetrate victim with "any object," including defen-
dant s finger); GROOT, supra note 16, at 429 (stating that § 18.2-672 may be violated by forced
sexual activity with animal).
75. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (stating "[t]here is no difficulty in identifying the
three sexual offenses").
76. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining offense of
rape). Section 18.2-61 reads, without its penalty provision:
A. If any person has sexual intercourse with a complaining witness who is not his
or her spouse or causes a complaining witness, whether or not his or her spouse, to
engage in sexual intercourse with any other person and such act is accomplished
(i) against the complaining witness's will, by force, threat or intimidation of or
against the complaining witness or another person, or (ii) through the use of the
complaining witness's mental incapacity or physical helplessness, or (iii) with a
child under age thirteen as the victim, he or she shall be guilty of rape.
B. If any person has sexual intercourse with his or her spouse and such act is
accomplished against the spouse's will by force, threat or intimidation of or against
the spouse or another, he or she shall be guilty of rape.
However, no person shall be found guilty under this subsection unless, at the
time of the alleged offense, (i) the spouses were living separate and apart, or (ii) the
defendant caused serious physical injury to the spouse by the use of force or
violence.
Id.
77. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 425 (noting that extramarital, nonspousal form is analog
to common-law rape: "It is committed when a perpetrator (male or female) has penile-vaginal
intercourse with an unwilling person of the opposite gender who is not the spouse of the
perpetrator."). Section 18.2-6A also includes provisions for causing rape, when the actual
intercourse must occur between non-spouses. See id. (noting that actual intercourse must occur
between non-spouses). Section 18.2-61.B covers marital rape, with the requirement that the
intercourse must be accomplished by force, threat or intimidation; however, if the spouses are
not living separately, there must be evidence of serious physical injury. See id. at 427. The
basic penalty for rape is five years to life. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61.C (stating "a violation
of this section shall be punishable, in the discretion of the court or jury, by confinement in a
state correctional facility for life or for any term not less than five years"). But see GROOT,
supra note 16, at 427 (noting that, for violation of § 18.2-61.B's marital rape provision,
§§ 18.2-61.C and 18.2-61.D permit suspension of sentence and probation without imposition
of sentence upon certain conditions).
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2. Sodomy and Object Sexual Penetration: Sections 18.2-671 and 18.2-6Z2
Codified at § 18.2-67, forcible sodomy includes cunnilingus, fellatio,
anallingus, and anal intercourse.71 The Code denominates inanimate or ani-
mate object sexual penetration at § 18.2-67.2 as "Object sexual penetration."79
78. See VA. CODE ANN. § 182-67.1 (defining offense offorcible sodomy). Section 18.2-
67.1 reads, without the penalty provision:
A. An accused shall be guilty of forcible sodomy if he or she engages in cunni-
lingus, fellatio, anallingus, or anal intercourse with a complaining witness who is
not his or her spouse, or causes a complaining witness, whether or not his spouse,
to engage in such acts with any other person and
1. The complaining witness is less than thirteen years of age, or
2. The act is accomplished against the will of the complaining witness, by force,
threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or another person, or
through the use of the complaining witness's mental incapacity or physical help-
lessness.
B. An accused shall be guilty of forcible sodomy if(i) he or she engages in cunni-
lingus, fellatio, anallingus, or anal intercourse with his or her spouse, and such act
is accomplished against the will of the spouse, by force, threat or intimidation of or
against the spouse or another person. However, no person shall be found guilty
under this subsection unless, at the time of the alleged offense, (i) the spouses were
living separate and apart, or (ii) the defendant caused serious physical injury to the
spouse by the use of force or violence.
Id.
79. See id. § 18.2-67.2 (defining offense of object sexual penetration). Section 18.2-67.2
reads, without the penalty provision:
A. An accused shall be guilty of inanimate or animate object sexual penetration if
he or she penetrates the labia majora or anus of a complaining witness who is not
his or her spouse with any object, other than for a bona fide medical purpose, or
causes such complaining witness to so penetrate his or her own body with an object
or causes a complaining witness, whether or not his or her spouse, to engage in
such acts with any other person or to penetrate, or to be penetrated, by, an animal,
and
1. The complaining witness is less than thirteen years of age, or
2. The act is accomplished against the will of the complaining witness, by force,
threat or intimidation of or against the complaining witness or another person, or
through the use of the complaining witness's mental incapacity or physical help-
lessness.
B. An accused shall be guilty of inanimate or animate object sexual penetration if
(i) he or she penetrates the labia majora or anus of his or her spouse with any object
other than for bona fide medical purpose, or causes such spouse to so penetrate his
or her own body with an object and (ii) such act is accomplished against the
spouse's will by force, threat or intimidation of or against the spouse or another
person. However, no person shall be found guilty under this subsection unless, at
the time of the alleged offense, (i) the spouses were living separate and apart, or
(ii) the defendant caused serious physical injury to the spouse by the use of force
or violence.
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The structure of sections § 18.2-67.1 and § 18.2-67.2 parallels the structure of
the rape statute; both include provisions for causing the offenses and for
violation by spouses.80 They are also punished by imprisonment for five years
to life."1 Both statutes require penetration: forcible sodomy requires penile or
lingual penetration;" object sexual penetration requires penetration of either
the labia majora or anus by either an animate or inanimate object.83 Section
18.2-32's references to forcible sodomy and inanimate or animate object sexual
penetration as predicate offenses for first degree felony murder clearly refer to
§§ 18.2-67.1 and 18.2-67.2." 4
3. Intransigent Interpretive and Doctrinal Issues
The clarity ofthe references for the sexual offenses in § 18.2-32 does not
eliminate a prosecutor's flexibility in charging for sex offenses that result in
a killing, nor does it affect her ability to lessen the burden of proof through the
use of the felony murder statute. For instance, a prosecutor might choose to
charge a killing committed in the course of a sexual assault when no inter-
course has occurred as either aggravated sexual battery and murder or at-
tempted rape felony murder. A prosecutor that charges aggravated sexual
battery and murder must prove two mental states, intent to commit the battery
and malice. Conversely, a prosecutor that charges attempted rape and at-
tempted rape felony murder need prove only an intent to have sexual inter-
course.
85
This distinction exists in spite of the fact that the accused's course of
conduct, whether charged as attempted rape or aggravated sexual battery, is
80. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 429 (noting that §§ 18.2-67.1 and 18.2-67.2 are con-
structed almost identically to rape statute, § 18.2-61).
81. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-67.1, 18.2-67.2 (providing penalties for offenses of
forcible sodomy and object sexual penetration). Both marital forcible sodomy and marital
object sexual penetration permit suspension of sentence and probation without imposition of
sentence under certain circumstances. Id.
82. See GROOT, supra note'16, at 429 (noting requirement of penetration (citing Dawson
v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 109, 113-14, 409 S.E.2d 466, 468 (1991) (holding victim's
statement that accused "had oral sex with me" insufficient to prove penetration))).
83. See Bell v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 93,98-99,468 S.E.2d 114, 116-17 (1996)
(noting statute makes it crime to sexually penetrate victim with "any object," including defen-
dant's finger); GROOT, supra note 16, at 429-30 (noting § 18.2-67.2 forbids penetration of labia
majora or anus by animate or inanimate object, and that 'animate object' is likely to include
body parts, e.g., fingers, as well as animals).
84. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (stating "[tlhere is no difficulty in identifying the
three sexual offenses").
85. See id. at 430 ("To commit sexual battery the accused must have the purpose to molest,
arouse or gratify.").
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a crime against a person that is likely to cause death. 6 It seems counter-
intuitive that a doctrine that allows a prosecutor to forego proof of a mental
state because of the dangerousness of the underlying offense should simulta-
neously permit that prosecutor to choose from a smorgasbord of intents, with
potentially varying levels of dangerousness.87 Although careful statutory
drafing is essential for appropriate application ofthe felony murder rule, even
clear references for predicate offenses will allow doctrinal problems to persist
in the application of the statute.88
While the references for the sex offenses pose few statutory interpretation
problems today, this was not always the case. Priorto 1998, § 18.2-32 referred
onlyto inanimate object sexual penetration, while § 18.2-3 1, the capital murder
statute, referred to object sexual penetration.89 The implication was that all
86. See Garland v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 189,191-92,379 S.E2d 146,147 (1989)
(noting while aggravated sexual battery is markedly similar to attempted rape where victim is
female and her genitalia are touched by perpetrator's penis, they are distinguishable by fact that
aggravated sexual battery does not require intent to have sexual intercourse, but attempted rape
does); Glover v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 382, 385, 10 S.E. 420, 421 (1889) (intent to commit
rape is essential element of an attempt to commit rape). It is notable that all of the predicate
sex-offenses require penetration or attempted penetration. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61,
18.2-67.1, 18.2-67.2 (M~fichie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining offenses of rape, forcible sodomy,
and object sexual penetration). This level of physical assault necessarily is inherently dangerous
conduct likely to impart death or harm to the victim, and may alone justify the inclusion of the
sex offenses as predicates for first degree felony murder. See Regina v. Sern6, 16 Cox Crim.
Cas. 311 (Cent. Crim. Ct Va. 1887) (stating "any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely
in itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony which caused death, should
be murder"); supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (explicating doctrinal justification of
felony murder rule).
87. A possible rationale for proceeding on the attempted rape count rests on the treatment
the Code gives penetration or attempted penetration, and the implication for the dangerousness
analysis. See supra note 74 and accompanying (discussing expansion of sex offense category
to include penetration by object or animal).
88. See 2 LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 208-11 (discussing limitation of
felony murder doctrine to certain felonies). Doctrinal problems with the predicate-offense
felony murder form the Virginia statute takes are unavoidable, particularly at the margins. The
problems tend to recapitulate inconsistencies that arise in application of the "inherently
dangerous in the abstract" approach to felony murder. "if the purpose of the felony-murder
doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct,
then it would seem to make little difference whether the felony committed was dangerous by its
very nature or merely dangerous as committed in the particular case." Id. at 210. Observing
the dangerous conduct of the accused in the hypothetical above, it makes little sense to exclude
aggravated sexual assault from the list of predicate offenses for felony murder. As with the
inherently dangerous limitation, exclusion of the aggravated sexual assault offense is "more
understandable. . . if viewed as an attempt... to limit.. . 'a highly artificial concept that
deserves no extension beyond its required application.'" Id. at 210 & nn.18, 20 (quoting People
v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353,360 (Cal. 1966)).
89. See 1998 Va. Acts ch. 281 (inserting "or animate" into text of felony murder statute).
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 561 (2000)
violations of § 18.2-67.2 were predicates for § 18.2-3 1, while only inanimate
object violations were considered predicate felonies within § 18.2-32. The
likely cause of the inconsistency was that § 18.2-32 was not amended after the
General Assembly added animate object sexual penetration to § 18.2-67.2 in
1993. The 1998 amendment to § 18.2-32 eliminated the inconsistency by
inserting the words "or animate," expanding the scope of the predicate offense
to include all object sexual penetrations under § 18.2-67.2."' Although the
discrepancy in language between § § 18.2-31, 18.2-32, and 18.2-67.2 no longer
poses interpretive problems, this recent history illustrates the confusion intro-
duced by the piecemeal amendment process, and demonstrates the effect this
approach has had on the scope of the capital and first degree felony murder
statutes in Virginia. This history also argues that the legislature might rectify
current ambiguities by modifying the language of § 18.2-32 once again, per-
haps to include direct citation to statutes following each predicate offense.'
B. Robbery
Although one may easily decipher the statutory references for § 18.2-32's
sex crime predicates by consulting the Code,' the statutory reference for
robbery is not clear. A series of unfortunate problems complicate the Code's
use of the word "robbery" to describe a predicate offense for first degree
felony murder. First, robbery is a common-law crime in Virginia.94 The
statutory provision cited in the cases, § 18.2-58, recites a variety of actions
that establish the violence or intimidation element for robbery and sets the
penalty for the offense, but it does not define robbery. 5 Second, the Article
90. Id.
91. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (providing predicate offenses for first degree felony
murder).
92. See infra Part IV (concluding that most expeditious method of eliminating ambiguities
in first degree felony murder statute is to cite predicate offenses by statutory section in Code).
93. See supra Part IlIA (explaining clarity of § 18.2-32's references for predicate
offenses of rape, sodomy, and object sexual penetration).
94. See George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264,277, 411 S.E.2d 12,20 (1991) ("Al-
though the punishment for robbery is fixed by statute, Code § 18.2-58, the offense is not
statutorily defined, and we must look to the common law for its definition.").
95. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-58 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (reading "[i]f any person
commit robbery by partial strangulation, or suffocation, or by striking or beating, or by other
violence to the person, or by assault or otherwise putting a person in fear of serious bodily harm,
or by the threat or presenting of firearms, or other deadly weapon or instrumentality whatsoever,
he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in a state correctional
facility for life or any term not less than five years"); George, 411 S.E.2d at 20 ("Although the
punishment for robbery is fixed by statute, Code § 182-58, the offense is not statutorily defined,
and we must look to the common law for its definition."); see also GROOT, supra note 16, at 415
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under which § 18.2-58 is included, Title 18.2, Chapter 4, Article 5, is itself
titled "Robbery."96 Third, in 1993 the General Assembly added an additional
offense to Article 5: Section 18.2-58.1, titled "Carjacking."'9  As it now
stands, one may read § 18.2-32's listing of robbery as a predicate offense
simply as referring to common-law robbery or to the whole of Article 5, titled
"Robbery," encompassing both common law robbery and caijacking. 9'
1. Common-Law Robbery: Section 18.2-58
Like rape and forcible sodomy, robbery was a felony at common law. 9
Similarly, like rape and forcible sodomy, robbery poses an inherent danger to
life."a° By contrast, larceny, although a felony at common law, is not ordi-
narily a dangerous felony."' The distinctions between robbery and its lesser-
included offense, larceny, illustrate this important difference in dangerous-
ness: in addition to the six elements of larceny, robbery requires that property
be taken from the person or presence of the victim and that the taking be
("The common law definition most often used in the Virginia cases is 'the taking, with the intent
to deprive the owner permanently, of personal property, from his person or in his presence,
against his will, by violence or intimidation.'" (citations omitted)).
96. See VA. CODE ANN. tit 18.2, ch. 4, art. 5 (Mchie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (titling Code
article "Robbery").
97. See id. § 18.2-58.1 (criminalizing carjacking).
98. See Bell v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 693, 701, 467 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1996)
(explaining passage of carjacking statute). In Bell, the court of appeals noted that the cajacking
offense was enacted as an additional provision in Article 5. Id. The Court also noted that, when
offered for passage by the General Assembly, the bill was captioned as "Aggravated robbery,
motor vehicle piracy, carjacking penalty." Id. at 293 n.2. It also stated that "[w]hile not part
of the code section, in the strictest sense, the caption may be considered in construing the
statute, as it is 'valuable and indicative of legislative intent"' Id. at 293 (citing Krummert v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 581, 584,43 S.E2d 831, 832 (1947)). The Bell factors supporting
the conclusion that § 18.2-58.1 is not unconstitutionally vague - that cajacking is a species of
robbery and that the General Assembly purposefully enacted carjacking under the same Article
as robbery - might substitute as arguments for a finding that carjacking is an appropriate pred-
icate offense for first degree felony murder. However, the ambiguity in the § 18.2-32 reference
to robbery remains.
99. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing doctrinal developments limiting
scope of felony murder doctrine to those offenses which were felonies at common law).
100. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 ("Since the felony murder doctrine imputes malice
from the predicate crime, it should be one in which the danger to human life is inherently very
probable."); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 208-09 (stating that common-law
felonies, with exception of larceny and consensual sodomy, but especially robbery, arson and
rape, involve danger to life).
101. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 209 & n.13 (stating that, because
larceny is not ordinarily dangerous felony, "if death should occur in an extraordinary, unforesee-
able fashion, it ought not to be murder").
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effectuated by means of force or intinidation.' ° The danger involved in
misappropriating property in a face-to-face confrontation by violence or threat
of violence justifies robbery's greater punishment.103 The danger inherent in
the commission of robbery also satisfies the felony murder rule's doctrinal
requirement that the predicate offense carry a serious threat to life.'
2. Cariacking: Section 18.2-58.1
Section 18.2-58.1 defines and sets the punishment for carjacking °5
Added in 1993, the caijacking statute is similar to the robbery statute in many
102. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 416 ("To make out robbery the Commonwealth must
prove violence or intimidation and must prove that the violence or intimidation preceded or was
contemporaneous with the taking."); 2 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 8.11, at 438 (noting
robbery consists of all six elements of larceny plus two additional requirements, and enumerat-
ing six elements of larceny as: "a (1) trespassory (2) taking and (3) carrying away of the
(4) personal property (5) of another (6) with the intent to steal it" and additional two robbery
elements as "(7) that the property be taken from the person or presence of the other and (8) that
the taking be accomplished by means of force or putting in fear"); supra note 95 (quoting
pertinent part of Code's robbery statute).
103. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 416-17 (noting forms of violence or intimidation speci-
fied in statute are very broad, and that violence or intimidation element distinguishes robbery and
"larceny from the person"); 2 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 47, § 8.11, at 437-3 8 & n.4 (noting
that robbery involves misappropriation of property under circumstances involving danger to
person as well as danger to property, and quoting Model Penal Code:
[Robbery] is one of the main sources of insecurity and concern of the population at large.
There is a special element of terror in this kind of depredation. The ordinary citizen does
not feel particularly threatened by surreptitious larceny, embezzlement or fraud. But there
is understandable abhorrence of the robber who accosts on the streets and who menaces
his victims with actual or threatened violence.... [t]he offender exhibits himself as
seriously deviated from community norms, thus justifing more serious sanctions).
Id. (quoting MODELPENAL CODE § 222.1 cmt. (1980)).
104. See OLvERWmDEILHOLMES, THE CoMMONLAW48-49 (MarkDeWolfe Howe, ed.,
Little Brown & Co. 1963) (stating general test of murder is degree of danger attending acts
under known state of facts, and that "[i]f certain acts are regarded as peculiarly dangerous under
certain circumstances, a legislator may make them punishable if done under these circum-
stances"); Note, Reforming the Law ofiHomicide, 59 VA. L. REV. 1270, 1275-76 (1973) ("It is
apparent that the Virginia legislature has attempted to limit the scope of the [felony murder] rule
to those felonies most likely to involve a serious threat to life."); supra Part H (explicating
felony murder doctrine at common law and in Virginia).
105. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58.1 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining offense of
carijacking). Section 18.2-58.1 reads, in pertinent part-
A. Any person who commits caijacking, as herein defined, shall be guilty of a
felony punishable by imprisonment for life or a term not less than fifteen years.
B. As used in this section, 'cadacking' means the intentional seizure or seizure of
control of a motor vehicle of another with intent to permanently or temporarily
deprive another in possession or control of the vehicle of that possession or control
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respects."° The statutory language in § 18.2-58.1 establishing the violence or
intimidation element for carjacking mirrors the language in the robbery
statute. 7 Also, like robbery, carjacking requires a taking of the personal
property of another from that person."ea
3. Proper Predicates for Section 18.2-32 Robbery
The distinctions between carijacking and robbery center on the personal
property and permanently deprive elements of the offense.0 9 Obviously, in
a carjacking, the accused must seize the victim's vehicle or seize control of
that vehicle, as opposed to robbery's more general requirement that the taking
involve any personal property."' Additionally, a carijacker need not intend to
deprive the owner of the vehicle permanently, but may intend only "tempo-
rarily [to] deprive another in possession or control" of the vehicle."'
Several arguments support the conclusion that violation of § 18.2-58.1
should serve as a predicate offense for first degree felony murder."' First
by means of partial strangulation, or suffocation, or by striking or beating, or by
other violence to the person, or by assault or otherwise putting a person in fear of
serious bodily harm, or by threat or presenting of firearms, or other deadly weapon
or instrumentality whatsoever.
Id.
106. See Bell v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 693, 701, 467 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1996)
(stating that cariacking "is a species of robbery" and "[t]hough the elements of carjacking and
robbery are not identical, the carjacking provision is nonetheless confined by the same limita-
tions which apply to robbery"); GROOT, supra note 16, at 81 (noting that felony of carjacking
"is closely akin to robbery").
107. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58 (containing robbery offense) with id. § 18.2-58.1
(using same statutory language for violence/intimidation element).
108. See id. § 18.2-58.1 (requiring intentional seizure or seizure of vehicle ofanother with
intent to deprive); Keyser v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 747, 750,473 S.E.2d 93, 94 (1996)
(noting accused must obtain actual control of the vehicle); GROOT, supra note 16, at 81 (stating
that accused must intentionally seize vehicle or seize control of vehicle); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 47, § 8.11, at 438 (listing elements of common-law robbery). But see supra notes
106-07 and accompanying text (distinguishing nature of taking under § 18.2-58.1 from taking
under § 18.2-58).
109. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 81 (stating that cariacking is more limited than robbery
in its subject matter and more expansive in that accused need only intend temporarily to
deprive).
110. See Bell, 467 S.E.2d at 292 (noting General Assembly enacted carjacking statute to
protect persons in possession or control of their vehicles); GROOT, supra note 16, at 81 (noting
stolen object must be motor vehicle).
111. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58.1 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (describing intent as
"intent to permanently or temporari" deprive (emphasis added)); GROOT, supra note 16, at 81
(noting accused need only intend temporarily to deprive).
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting factors in Bell v. Commonwealth,
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among these is that because § 18.2-58.1 includes the same violence or intimi-
dation element as § 18.2-58, carijacking is as inherently dangerous as robbery.
Like robbery, a carjacking necessarily includes misappropriating property in
a face-to-face confrontation by violence or threat of violence.1 3 Second, as
the Virginia Court of Appeals noted, because the General Assembly enacted
§ 18.2-58.1 as an aggravated form of robbery, it makes little sense to exclude
the aggravated form of an offense from the scope of first degree felony murder
predicates when the general form of the offense qualifies. 4 The penalty
structures for the two offenses support this argument. The penalty for robbery
is life or any term not less than five years, and for carijacking the penalty is life
or any term not less than fifteen years."' This comparison indicates the
General Assembly considers carijacking to be at least as serious an offense as
robbery.
Nonetheless, an argument in favor of including carjacking as a predicate
offense in § 18.2-32 must explain how that section references carijacking when
it lists only robbery as a predicate. For carijacking to be within the scope of
the predicate offense named as "robbery" in § 18.2-32, that term cannot refer
to § 18.2-58 alone." 6 It must refer either to the whole of Article 5, orto some
definable category of "robbery" offenses, such as those having the same or
appropriately similar elements as common-law robbery. 7
However, neither of these possibilities comports with the manner in
which § 18.2-32 designates the predicates for sexual offenses."" Those refer-
ences are to precise sections of the Code rather than to larger subdivisions
thereof. 9 This precision in the reference to the sexual offenses is particularly
notable in the case of object sexual penetration, which clearly refers to § 18.2-
21 Va. App. 693, 701, 467 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1996) that might apply to predicate offense
argument).
113. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining danger inherent in offense of
robbery).
114. See Bell, 467 S.E2d at 293 & n.2 (noting bill offered for passage by General Assem-
bly was captioned "Aggravated robbery, motor vehicle piracy, cariacking penalty").
115. See VA. CoDEANN. §§ 18.2-58 & 18.2-58.1 (stating penalty for robbery as life or any
term not less than five years, and penalty for cariacking as life or any term not less than fifteen
years).
116. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing possible scope of predicate
offense of robbery).
117. See 2 LAFAvE & SCoTr, supra note 47, § 7.5, at206-08 (discussing interface between
common law and statutory limitations on scope of felony murder rule).
118. See supra Part ]IIA (explaining clarity of references to sexual predicate offenses for
first degree felony murder in § 18.2-32).
119. See supra Part lIA (explaining clarity of references to sexual predicate offenses for
first degree felony murder in § 18.2-32).
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67.2,120 and, like carIjacking, is a statutorily-created offense.' Neither of the
two analyses explaining § 18.2-32's reference to robbery as encompassing
carjacking are consistent with § 18.2-32's references to the sexual predicate
offenses.
Although one may make a plausible argument for including carIjacking
under the rubric of robbery, that fact does not legitimate the ambiguity of
§ 18.2-32's use of the word "robbery." Arguably, the inherently dangerous
nature of carjacking justifies its inclusion as a species of robbery, but the
scope of the predicate offense should be apparent from the face of the
statute.122 It should not require an inquiry into the doctrinal underpinnings of
the felony murder rule to rationalize the result. 123 This ambiguity runs con-
trary to the basic purpose of statutory codification and erects analytical
barriers to citizens without legal training.
C. Arson
Arson has been a predicate felony for first degree murder since at least
1849.124 Nonetheless, the statutory reference remains unclear."2  Like rob-
bery, arson is not a statutory crime in Virginia.126 . The first Article within
Chapter 5 ofthe Code, "Crimes against Property," is titled "Arson and Related
Crimes."'127 The first offense in the Article, § 18.2-77, titled "Burning or
destroying dwelling house, etc.," is the closest the Code comes to arson as it
120. See supra Part lIlA (explaining clarity of references to sexual predicate offenses for
first degree felony murder in § 18.2-32).
121. See supra Part 11A (explaining clarity of references to sexual predicate offenses for
first degree felony murder in § 18.2-32).
122. See Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 7, 16, 402 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1991)
(noting penal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to define offense "with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" (quoting Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983))).
123. See id. at 234 (noting requirement that law "give the person of ordinary intelligence
a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited" (quoting Coleman v. City of Richmond,
5 Va. App. 459,466, 364 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1988) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)))).
124. See VA. CODE ch. 191, § 1 (Ritchie 1849) (defining offense of homicide).
125. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (noting difficulty in identifying reference for arson
within Code).
126. See VA. CoDEANN. tit 18.2, ch. 5, art. 1, (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (titling article
"Arson and Related Crimes," but containing no statutory offense called arson); GROOT, supra
note 16, at 273 ("Virginia no longer has a specific crime called arson...").
127. See VA. CODE ANN. tiL 18.2, ch. 5, arL 1 (titng article "Arson and Related Crimes");
PERKINS, supra note 62, at 216 (defining common-law arson as malicious burning of dwelling
of another).
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was defined under the common law. 28 However, § 18.2-77 is much broader
in scope than its common-law corollary." Additionally, Chapter 5, Article 1
includes several other burning crimes. 3 ' Like robbery, the arson reference in
§ 18.2-32 is frustrated by these interpretive obstacles: the discontinuities
between potential statutory references and the common-law offense; the
absence of a direct statutory corollary in the Code; an ambiguous article
heading that includes the name of the predicate offense; and the presence of
multiple offenses within that Article.'
1. Common-Law Arson
Arson was a felony at common law.3 2 Like rape and robbery, common-
law arson involves a significant prospect ofharm to persons.' The common-
law formulation requires that the ignited structure be a dwelling place, making
arson an offense against a habitation, rather than merely an offense against
property.' This factor focuses the offense of arson on burnings that carry an
inherent threat to human life.
135
128. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (stating § 18.2-77 is "closest analog to common law
arson").
129. See id. at 21 (noting substantial differences between § 18.2-77 and common-law
arson: "First, § 18.2-77 is violated by one who bums his own dwelling house or manufactured
home. Second, the range of structures covered by § 18.2-77 is much broader than the common
law dwelling. Third, § 18.2-77 includes two degrees of crime.").
130. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-77 ("Burning or destroying dwelling house, etc."); id.
§ 18.2-79 ("Burning or destroying meeting house, etc."); id. § 18.2-80 ("Burning or destroying
any other building or structure"); id. § 18.2-81 ("Burning or destroying personal property,
standing grain, etc."); id. § 18.2-82 ("Burning building or structure while in such building or
structure with intent to commit felony"); § 18.2-86 ("Setting fire to woods, fences, grass, etc.");
§ 18.2-87 ("Setting woods, etc., on fire intentionally whereby another is damaged or jeopar-
dized"); § 18.2-88 ("Carelessly damaging property by fire").
131. See supra Part IIl.B (explaining particular problems with § 18.2-32's reference to
robbery as predicate offense for first degree felony murder).
132. See PERKINs, supra note 62, at 217 (noting arson was common-law felony from
earliest days, and at one time punishment was death by burning); see also notes 55-60 and
accompanying text (discussing doctrinal developments limiting scope of felony murder doctrine
to those offenses which were felonies at common law).
133. See 2 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 211 (listing specific felonies that
involve significant prospect of violence).
134. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 21 ("At common law a dwelling was a place of resi-
dence."); PERKNS, supra note 62, at 223 (stating that, like burglary, at common law, arson "was
an offense against the habitation and not against property").
135. See PERKINS, supra note 62, at 218, 223 (noting restrictions on dwelling, including
that it must be place of residence, it does not become one before first dweller has moved in, and
definition extends to barn or stable if usually occupied at night by lodger, and also stating that
"[flew types of harm of comparable gravity. . . are so likely to result from mischance... as the
burning of a dwelling").
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Other elements of arson also concern the dangerousness of the offense.
Common-law arson requires that the dwelling burned be "of another. 13 6 One
cannot be guilty of common-law arson for setting fire to one's own
dwelling.137 An attack on another's habitation, particularly if unsuspected,
increases the risk of death or serious injury."' Additionally, common-law
arson does not reach negligent burnings, but requires a higher level of mental
state, punishing those who willfully increase the risk of harm to others." 9
2. Arson in the Code
a. Dwelling Places: Section 18.2-77
Section 18.2-77, titled "Burning or destroying dwelling house, etc.," is
the closest burning offense Virginia has to common-law arson. 4° However,
136. See id. at 226 (noting that "the statement frequently encountered is that it must be the
'house of another,' but it is possession or occupancy and not title which determines whose
house a building shall be said to be for such purposes" (citations omitted)).
137. See id. at 226-27 (explaining that arson does not include burning one's own dwelling,
unless one does so with "the purpose of burning the dwelling of another, or under such circum-
stances that there is obviously great danger of such a result... [and] the fire is actually com-
municated to the other house").
138. See id. (stating that arson "is an offense which involves a disturbance of the 'security
of the dwelling house' . .. [and that] [t]he human hazard created by the conflagration of a
dwelling is not limited to the dweller and his household because members of the fire department
may be expected to come, friends and neighbors may attempt to be of assistance, and some of
these may go onto or into the building to fight the blaze").
139. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 23 (noting that common-law arson includes reckless as
well as intentional bumings); PERKINS, supra note 62, at 217-19 (noting use of "voluntary" and
"willful" to describe intent of actor, defining common-law arson as "the malicious burning of
the dwelling of another," and stating that negligent burnings do not constitute common-law
arson).
140. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-77 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining burning
offense). Section 18.2-77 reads, in pertinent part:
A. If any person maliciously (i) bums, or by use of any explosive device or sub-
stance destroys, in whole or in part, or causes to be burned or destroyed, or (ii) aids,
counsels, or procures the burning or destruction of any dwelling house or manufac-
tured home whether belonging to himself or another, or any occupied hotel, hospi-
tal, mental health facility, or other house in which persons usually dwell or lodge,
any occupied railroad car, boat, vessel, or river craft in which persons usually dwell
or lodge, or any occupied jail or prison, or any occupied church or occupied
building owned or leased by a church that is immediately adjacent to a church, he
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for life or for any period not
less than five years ... [a]ny person who maliciously sets fire to anything, or aids,
counsels or procures the setting fire to anything, by the burning whereof such
occupied dwelling house, manufactured home, hotel, hospital, mental health facility
or other house, or railroad car, boat, vessel, or river craft, jail or prison, church or
building owned or leased by a church that is immediately adjacent to a church, is
burned shall be guilty of a violation of this subsection.
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§ 18.2-77 differs from common-law arson in many respects. First, § 18.2-77
extends the range of structures covered under common-law arson to include
river craft, railroad cars, and manufactured houses. 41 In doing so, though,
§ 18.2-77, like common-law arson, requires that those structures be resi-
dences.
142
Beyond broadening the range of structures, § 18.2-77 differs from
common-law arson in that it allows the prosecution of one who burns her own
dwelling.143 Furthermore, § 18.2-77 separates the offense into two degrees,
with punishment turning on whether the burned structure was occupied or
unoccupied.'" The statute also specifically proscribes setting fire to other
things that in turn burn a dwelling place,145 a result reached by judicial inter-
pretation under the common law.'
46
While § 18.2-77 differs in many respects from common-law arson, the
statute criminalizes conduct that inherently is likely to cause death or serious
injury. 47 Also, § 18.2-77 is the only burning offense in the Code that ad-
dresses attacks on habitations. 4 ' To the extent that § 18.2-77 broadens the
Id.; GROOT, supra note 16, at 21 ("Section 18.2-77 is the nearest Virginia analog to common
law arson"); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 182-78 (distinguishing those structures not deemed
dwelling house, but creating no separate offense).
141. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 21-22 (noting that range of structures § 18.2-77 covers
is much broader than common-law dwelling).
142. See id. at 22 ("In sum, each of the places listed in § 18.2-77 must be resided in to be
the subject matter of § 18.2-77 arson."); supra note 140 (listing pertinent elements of§ 18.2-77).
143. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 21 (noting, as substantial difference from common-law
arson, that "§ 18.2-77 is violated by one who bums his own dwelling house or manufactured
home"); PERKINS, supra note 62, at 227 (noting human hazard involved in arson is such that
many modem legislators have removed requirement that house burned be that of another, and
that means of expansion of statute has most frequently been by "the insertion of some such
phrase as 'the property of himself or of another'" (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-75 (Mlchie
1960), currently in force as VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-77 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999))); supra
note 140 (quoting portion of § 18.2-77 that states individual's burning of building is violation,
"whether belonging to himself or another person...").
144. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-77 (distinguishing penalty for violation of the statute as
five years to life and fine of up to $100,000 if structure is occupied, but punished as Class 4
felony ifunoccupied); GROOT, supra note 16, at 21-23 (noting that offense includes two degrees
of crime, and discussing difficulties attendant determination of whether structure is unoccu-
pied).
145. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-77 (including prohibition on "setting fire to anything" that
bums dwelling place).
146. See PERKINS, supra note 62, at 221-22 (discussing variety of interpretations that bring
indirect burning methods within subject matter of common-law arson).
147. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (noting that burning or bombing habitation, as
covered by § 18.2-77, contains inherent danger to human life).
148. See id. at 273 (noting that § 18.2-77 is only arson statute in Virginia Code dealing
with habitations).
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scope of arson, it only does so to reach similar conduct that involves the same
hazard to human life.'4 9 For these reasons, § 18.2-77 is an appropriate predi-
cate for felony murder.5
b. The Meeting House: Public Buildings and Section 18.2-79
Section 18.2-79, titled "Burning or destroying meeting house, etc.," crim-
inalizes the burning ofpublic buildings not used for habitation.' Those public
buildings that might be used for habitation, such as hotels and jails, are within
the scope of § 18.2-77,"52 and are specifically excluded from § 18.2-79.' Like
§ 18.2-77, the Code separates § 18.2-79 into two grades,' 54 with the grades
determined by the presence or absence of a person in the building." If the
149. See id at 22 (noting phrase in § 18.2-77, "in which persons usually dwell or lodge"
essentially restates common-law test for determining whether place ordinarily not residence
became dwelling and thereby became subject matter of arson); PERKMS, supra note 62, at 225
(noting some statutory schemes "subordinate the common-law concept of arson and emphasize
the element of human danger as by providing that it is 'aggravated arson' if it involves 'any
structure, water craft, or movable, wherein it is foreseeable that human life may be endangered'"
(citations omitted)).
150. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (stating that violation of § 18.2-77 is proper
predicate felony for § 18.2-32 felony murder).
151. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-79 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (establishing burning
offense). Section 18.2-79 reads:
If any person maliciously bums, or by the use of any explosive device or substance,
maliciously destroys, in whole or in part, or causes to be burned or destroyed, or
aids, counsels, or procures the burning or destroying, of any meeting house, court-
house, townhouse, college, academy, schoolhouse, or other building erected for
public use except an asylum, hotel, jail, prison or church or building owned or
leased by a church that is immediately adjacent to a church, or any banking house,
warehouse, storehouse, manufactory, mill, or other house, whether the property of
himself or of another person, not usually occupied by persons lodging therein at
night, at a time when any person is therein, or if he maliciously sets fire to anything,
or causes to be set on fire, or aids, counsels, or procures the setting on fire of
anything, by the burning whereof any building mentioned in this section is burned,
at a time when any person is therein, he shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony. If such
offense is committed when no person is in such building mentioned in this section,
the offender shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
Id.
152. 'See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (discussing differences between
common-law arson dwelling and § 18.2-77 dwelling).
153. See supra note 151 (quoting § 18.2-79, including portion reading "except an asylum,
hotel, jail or prison").
154. See supra note 151 (quoting § 18.2-79, including penalty provision); supra note 144
and accompanying text (explaining penalty provision for § 18.2-77).
155. See GROOT, supra note 16, at24 (noting that like § 18.2-77, § 18.2-79 is graded, and
that "severity depends upon the presence of a person in the building"); supra note 151 (quoting
§ 18.2-79, including penalty provision).
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Commonwealth establishes that a person was in the building, the crime is a
Class 3 felony; otherwise, § 18.2-79 is punishable as a Class 4 felony.5 6 With
respect to all other elements, §§ 18.2-77 and 18.2-79 are the same.5 7
c. Other Structures: Sections 18.2-80 and 18.2-82
The Code contains two other statutes that address the burning of struc-
tures. Sections 18.2-80 and 18.2-82 cover structure burning offenses outside
the scope of the more dangerous burnings delineated in §§ 18.2-77 and 18.2-
79.' Section 18.2-80, titled "Burning or destroying any other building or
structure,' ' 59 requires proof that the violator acted maliciously in burning or
destroying; 6 ° it reaches all structures not covered by §§ 18.2-77 and 18.2-
79.161 The structure need not be a building. 62 Section 18.2-80 also covers
burnings intended to defraud an insurance company.163 Like § 18.2-79, the
156. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (quoting § 18.2-77); supra note 151
(quoting § 18.2-79, including penalty provision).
157. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 23 ("The acts, mental state, and results which will
support a conviction under § 182-79 are exactlythe same as those set out [for § 18.2-77].").
158. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-82 (Mlchie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (stating that burning
covered by section is that burning which is "not punishable under any other section of this
chapter"); GROOT, supra note 16, at 23 (noting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-80 protects structure if
it is not covered by §§ 18.2-77 or 18.2-79).
159. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-80 (establishing burning offense). Section 18.2-80 reads:
If any person maliciously, or with intent to defraud an insurance company or other
person, bum, or by the use of any explosive device or substance, maliciously
destroy, in whole or in part, or cause to be burned or destroyed, or aid, counsel or
procure the burning or destruction of any building, bridge, lock, dam or other
structure, whether the property of himself or of another, at a time when any person
is therein or thereon, the burning or destruction whereof is not punishable under
any other section of this chapter, he shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony. If he
commits such offense at a time when no person is in such building, or other struc-
ture, and such building, or other structure, with the property therein, be of value of
$200, or more, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony, and if it and the property
therein be of less value, he shall be guilty of a Class I misdemeanor.
Id.
160. See supra note 159 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-80, including mental state
requirement for burning offense).
161. See supra note 159 (stating subject matter of section as "the burning or destruction
whereof is not punishable under any other section of this chapter"); GROOT, supra note 16, at
24 (noting structures protected by § 18.2-80 are those structures not covered by §§ 18.2-77 and
18.2-79).
162. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 24 (noting that structure need not be building: "[t]hus
an outhouse excepted from § 18.2-77 by § 18.2-78 is within this section").
163. See supra note 159 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-80, including element stating
"If any person maliciously, or with intent to defraud an insurance company or other person,
bum...").
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Code separates § 18.2-80 into grades according to whether or not a person was
present in the structure.
16
Section 18.2-82, titled "Burning building or structure while in such build-
ing or structure with intent to commit felony" does not require proof that the
burning was malicious. 65 It does require that the violator be in the structure
unlawfully with the intent to commit a felony inside the building."6 Also, in
order to be actionable under § 18.2-82, a burning may not be punishable under
any of the other burning statutes. 67 The only purpose for § 18.2-82 may be
to criminalize the negligent or accidental burning of buildings by burglars."e
d. Nonstructural Burnings:
Sections 18.2-81, 18.2-86, 18.2-87, and 18.2-88
(1) Property and Crops
There are four other burning offenses in the Code, none of which directly
concern the burning of structures. 69 Section 18.2-81, titled "Burning or
destroying personal property, standing grain, etc.""' protects personal prop-
164. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 24 (noting § 18.2-80 is "internally graded by presence");
supra note 159 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-80, with division by grades).
165. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-82 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (establishing burning
offense). Section 18.2-82 reads:
If any person while in any building or other structure unlawfully, with intent to
commit a felony therein, shall bum or cause to be burned, in whole or in part, such
building or other structure, the burning of which is not punishable under any other
section of this chapter, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
Id.
166. See supra note 165 (stating elements of § 18.2-82).
167. See supra note 165 (stating elements of § 18.2-82).
168. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 24 (stating § 18.2-82 "permits conviction of a burglar
who accidentally or negligently [burns a building and].... this may be its only necessary
application [because] ... [t]he only bumings not punishable under another section are those
which are not malicious").
169. See VA. CODE ANN. tit. 182, ch. 5, art 1 (naming offenses within article titled "Arson
and Related Crimes").
170. See id. § 18.2-8 (defining burning offense). Section 18.2-81 reads:
If any person maliciously, or with intent to defraud an insurance company or other
person, set fire to or bum or destroy by any explosive device or substance, or cause
to be burned, or destroyed by any explosive device or substance, or aid, counsel,
or procure the burning or destroying by any explosive device or substance, of any
personal property, standing grain or other crop, he shall, if the thing burnt or
destroyed, be of the value of $200 or more, be guilty of a Class 4 felony, and if the
thing burnt or destroyed be of less value, he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misde-
menor.
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erty and standing crops. 1 ' The burning must be done either maliciously or
with the intent to defraud an insurance company or other person.7 2 In this
regard, it is a parallel statute to § 18.2-80, which has structural burnings as its
subject matter. 73 However, unlike § 18.2-80, the Code does not grade § 18.2-
81 by the physical presence of another person; 4 instead, because it deals
explicitly with personal property and standing crops, § 18.2-81 is graded
according to the value of"the thing burnt or destroyed."'75 Because § 18.2-81
emphasizes attacks on property, and not on habitations, it does not fit within
the inherently dangerous rubric of arson and is therefore an improper predi-
cate for first degree felony murder.
7 6
(2) Setting the Woods on Fire
Section 18.2-86, titled "Setting fire to woods, fences, grass, etc., 177 is a
Class 6 felony. 7  Like the realty burning offenses,7 the burning in § 18.2-86
must be done maliciously.' The burning itself may be of anything that can
spread fire on land.'
Section 18.2-87 also prohibits burning anything that can spread fire on
land. 8 2 The fire must be set "intentionally.'08 3 The violator also must inten-
171. See supra note 170 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-81 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999),
including subject matter of offense).
172. See supra note 170 (quoting VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-81, including mental state require-
ment).
173. See supra note 161-63 and aecompanying text (discussing subject matter of§ 18.2-80).
174. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing division of § 18.2-80 accord-
ing to presence).
175. See supra note 170 (quoting VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-81 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999),
including grading of offense).
176. See supra notes 132-39 (discussing elements that establish inherent dangerousness
of common-law arson).
177. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-86 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining burning offense).
Section 18.2-86 reads: "[i]f any person maliciously set fire to any wood, fence, grass, straw or
other thing capable of spreading fire on land, he shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony." Id.
178. See supra note 177 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-86, including grade of offense).
179. See supra Parts MII.C.2.a-c (discussing offenses within article involving burning of
realty and mental states required by those statutes).
180. See supra note 177 (quoting VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-86, including mental state require-
ment).
181. See supra note 177 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-86, including subject matter of
offense).
182. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-87 (defining burning offense). Section 18.2-87 reads:
Any person who intentionally sets or procures another to set fire to any woods,
brush, leaves, grass, straw, or any other inflammable substance capable of spreading
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tionally allow the fire to escape onto another's land."' Once there, the fire
must damage or jeopardize property.'85
The last burning offense in Title 18.2, Chapter 5, Article 1, is § 18.2-88,
titled "Carelessly damaging property by fire."'8 6 The burning may be of any
substance capable of spreading fire"8 and must damage orjeopardize property
of another.'88 As its name suggests, a negligent mental state is sufficient to
convict under the statute. 9 Violation of § 18.2-88 is a Class 4 misde-
meanor.19 Both §§ 18.2-87 and 18.2-88 hold the violator liable for the cost
incurred in fighting the fire. 91
3. Proper Predicates for Section 18.2-32 Arson
Although Virginia has abandoned common-law arson in favor of a more
elaborate statutory scheme,"9 it does not follow that § 18.2-32's predicate of
arson should embrace all the burning offenses in the Code. 93 Several of the
fire, and who intentionally allows the fire to escape to lands not his own, whereby
the property of another is damaged or jeopardized, shall be guilty of a Class 1
misdemeanor, and shall be liable for the full amount of all expenses incurred in
fighting the fire.
Id.
183. See supra note 182 (quoting VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-87 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999),
including mental state requirement).
184. See supra note 182 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-87, including act requirement).
185. See supra note 182 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-87, including act requirement).
186. See VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-88 (defining burning offense). Section 18.2-88 reads:
If any person carelessly, negligently or intentionally set any woods or marshes on
fire, or set fire to any stubble, brush, or straw, or any other substance capable of
spreading fire on lands, whereby the property of another is damaged or jeopardized,
he shall be guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor, and shall be liable for the full amount
of all expenses incurred in fighting the fire.
Id.
187. See supra note 186 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-88, including act requirement).
188. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 25 (emphasizing that fire need not escape to other land
because fire need only jeopardize other lands); supra note 186 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
88, including act requirement).
189. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 25 (noting § 18.2-88 "is effectively a lesser included
offense of § 18.2-87" and that it "is sufficient for conviction that the fire was set negligently or
carelessly"); supra note 186 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-88 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999),
including mental state requirement); see also supra note 188 (explaining elements of offense).
190. See supra note 186 (quoting § 18.2-88, including grading of offense).
191. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 25 (noting criminal sanctions under §§ 18.2-87 and
18.2-88 are relatively minor, but that civil sanction, recovery of firefighting expenses, is severe).
192. See supra Part ml.C.2 (examining burning offense statutes in Virginia Code).
193. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (naming range of burning offenses in
Code).
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offenses do not qualify as arson; 94 others are simply not acceptable predicates
for first degree felony murder on their fhceb. Ultimately, the only appropri-
ate predicate offense in the Code for § 18.2-32's arson reference is § 18.2-
77.19 Section 18.2-77 is the only burning offense that directly addresses
common-law arson's protection of dwelling places, the element which makes
the offense inherently dangerous." The penalties for the offenses and the
structure of the Code also point to this conclusion."r
a. Dwelling Structures
The common law explicitly limits arson to dwelling places. Some risk
to human life attends the burning of any structure, but the increased risk of
death or serious injury involved in the burning of a residence is particularly
alarming.2" The historic common-law sanction for arson, death by burning,
illustrates the social opprobrium attached to attacks on habitations.2"' The
inherent dangerousness of such attacks justifies the inclusion of arson as a
predicate offense for felony murder. 2 Virginia's arson predicate should
194. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing inappropriateness of§ 18.2-81
as predicate for first degree felony murder).
195. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing mental state requirement for
§ 18.2-88); see also Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273,280-81,322 S.E.2d 216,220 (1984)
(stating, in context of second degree felony murder, "defendant must be shown to have willfully
or purposefully, rather than negligently, embarked upon a course of wrongfil conduct likely to
cause death or great bodily harm"). Essex explicates, in the second degree felony murder
context, the proposition that negligent acts cannot serve as a basis to impute malice for felony
murder purposes. Id.
196. See supra note 140 (quoting § 18.2-77, dwelling-place arson statute).
197. See supra notes 132-39 (discussing inherent dangerousness of common-law arson).
198. See infra Part IJ.C.3.b (examining penalty structures for burning offenses). That the
arson reference in § 18.2-32 is to § 18.2-77 also is supported by the tendency of the General
Assembly specifically to refer to lesser burning crimes when it includes them in the general
category arson. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 & n. 11 (noting this use in § 18.2-90 and
stating that failure to include other burning crimes in § 18.2-32 "probably limits the term 'arson'
to § 18.2-77").
199. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 21 ("At common law a dwelling was a place of resi-
dence."); PERKNS, supra note 62, at 223 (stating that, like burglary, at common law, arson "was
an offense against the habitation and not against property").
200. See infra note 226 (discussing common-law treatment of attacks on habitations in
context of burglary). The fact that people are more likely to be asleep or less watchful in their
homes accounts for the added danger. There also may be an increased risk that fire will trap
unsuspecting children,
201. See PERKINS, supra note 62, at 217 (noting that arson was common-law felony from
earliest days, and that at one time punishment was death by burning).
202. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 211 (listing specific felonies
involving significant prospect of violence).
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address an equivalent level of dangerousness and should include common-law
arson's emphasis on dwellings. 3
Only four sections in the Code deal with attacks on structures, and of
these four, only § 18.2-77 explicitly addresses attacks on habitations. °' Fol-
lowing § 18.2-77, the subject matter of succeeding statutes tracks a widening
ambit of concern, away from the home and into the world at large. Section
18.2-79 looks beyond dwelling structures, focusing instead on public build-
ings like schools and the work place. 5 Section 18.2-82 covers the narrow
case of the negligent burglar.' 6 Moving into the general is § 18.2-80, which
covers "any other building or structure. '20 7 Outside the perimeter drawn by
these three building-related statutes, the Code addresses the nonstructural
world in §§ 18.2-81, 18.2-86, 18.2-87, and 18.2-88, all of which concernthe
burning of land.' °
b. Penalty Structure
As the subject matter of the burning offenses moves outward from habi-
tations, the severity oftheir penalties decreases coordinately. Section 18.2-77,
the dwelling house statute, is punishable, at its maximum, by life imprison-
ment and a fine of $100,000.2° Section 18.2-79, the meeting house statute,
is punishable, at its maximum, by twenty years and a fine of $100,000.210
Section 18.2-82 awards the negligent burglar a maximum term of ten years
and the same $100,000 fine.211
As for the nonstructural burning offenses, § 18.2-81 is punishable by a
maximum of ten years imprisonment if the crops or property destroyed are
203. See supra Part MH.C.1 (discussing common-law arson).
204. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-77 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (establishing burning
offense); supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text (noting that while § 18.2-77 is broader
than common-law arson, its elements remain focused on inherent dangers attending attacks on
dwellings).
205. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-79 (establishing burning offense); supra notes 151-57 and
accompanying text (discussing scope of meeting house burning offense).
206. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-82 (establishing burning offense); supra note 168 and
accompanying text (discussing purpose of§ 18.2-82).
207. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-80 (establishing burning offense); supra notes 158-64 and
accompanying text (discussing general nature of § 18.2-80).
208. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-81, 18.2-86, 18.2-87, & 18.2-88 (establishing various
burning offenses for protection of property, crops, and land); supra notes 169-91 (discussing
elements of statutes).
209. See VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-77 (establishing penalty for burning dwelling place).
210. See id. § 18.2-10(c) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (establishing penalty for Class 3
felonies).
211. See id. § 18.2-10(d) (establishing punishment for Class 4 felonies).
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valued above $200.212 Section 18.2-86, a Class 6 felony, has amaximumterm
of five years.213 The remaining two burning offenses, §§ 18.2-87 and 18.2-88
are both misdemeanors. 214  The maximum prison time for violation of the
former is twelve months.21' The latter is punishable by a fine of not more than
$250.216 However, both carry a civil penalty: violators are liable for all ex-
penses incurred in fighting the fire.217
Virginia's elaborate statutory scheme establishes a hierarchy of offenses
through its penalty structure. Like the common law, the Code deems attacks
on dwelling houses as most serious, and this form of arson receives the most
severe penalty.21 It is clear from their status as misdemeanor offenses that
§§ 18.2-87 and 18.2-88 are inappropriate predicates for felony murder.
c. Textual Structure
The name of Title 18.2, Chapter 5, Article 1 is "Arson and Related
Crimes." 19 This designation implies that within Article I there is one offense
in the category "arson" and more than one offense related to but not in the
category "arson." It follows that at leasttwo offenses must be "related crimes"
and not "arson." This understanding argues against a wholesale inclusion of
all burning offenses in Article 1 as predicates for § 18.2-32.
Comparisons with other portions of the Code support this analysis.
Article 2 of Chapter 5 in Title 18.2 is titled "Burglary and Related Offenses."" °
Section 18.2-89, the first and most serious offense inthe article, 1 defines and
grades the crime of burglary.' - Necessarily, as § 18.2-89 is burglary, the
212. See id. (establishing punishment for Class 4 felonies). If the property destroyed is
valued at less than $200, burning is a Class 1 misdemeanor, has a maximum penalty of twelve
months imprisonment and a fine of $2,500. See id. § 18.2-11(a) (establishing penalty for
Class I misdemeanors).
213. See id. § 18.2-10(f) (establishing punishment for Class 6 felonies).
214. See id §§ 18.2-87,18.2-88 (establishing grades for burning offenses).
215. See id. § 18.2-11 (a) (establishing punishment for Class I misdemeanors).
216. See id. § 18.2-11(d) (establishing punishment for Class 4 misdemeanors).
217. See id. §§ 18.2-87 & 18.2-88 (establishing civil liability for violation of burning
offenses); supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing severity of civil liability for land-
burning offenses).
218. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text (comparing penalties for burning
offenses).
219. See VA. CoDEANN. tit. 18.2, ch. 5, art. 1 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (establishing
offenses titled "Arson and Related Crimes"').
220. See VA. CODE ANN. tit 18.2, ch. 5, art. 2 (establishing offenses titled "Burglary and
Related Offenses").
221. See id. (codifying § 18.2-89); GROT, supra note 16, at 69-76 (examining burglary
and related offenses section of Code).
222. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-89 (defining and grading offense of burglary).
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remaining crimes are the "related offenses" of the title. If the Code structures
Article 1 of the same Chapter, "Arson and Related Crimes," in a parallel
fashion, then the first and most serious offense, § 18.2-77, is "arson," and the
remaining offenses are "related crimes."' Therefore, when § 18.2-32 names
arson as a predicate offense for first degree felony murder, the reference is to
§ 18.2-77, and not to any other burning offense.224
D. Burglary
1. Common-Law Burglary
Like rape, robbery, arson, and forcible sodomy, burglary was a felony at
common law.' The common law considered burglary a heinous offense
because it was an attack, not on property, but on a person's right of
habitation.22 The elements of common-law burglary are the breaking and
entering of the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the intent to
commit a felony. 7 The dwelling house and structural elements imply that
burglary poses an inherent danger to life.'
223. See id. tit. 18.2, chap. 5,art. 1 (establishing offenses titled "Arson and Related Crimes").
224. - See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (noting § 18.2-77 is proper predicate felony because
of danger to human life). However, §§ 18.2-79 and 18-2-80 do not carry the same inherent risk.
Id.
225. See 2 LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 208 (noting that felonies at common
law are rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, and larceny); supra notes 60 & 62 and
accompanying text (discussing doctrinal developments limiting scope of felony murder doctrine
to those offenses that were felonies at common law).
226. See 2 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 47, § 8.13, at 469 (stating theoretical basis of
common-law burglary as "protection of man's right of habitation" and noting Blackstone's
commentary that burglary was crime which burglarized could punish with death, and which, in
civilized society, law would punish similarly); C. S. Parnell, Annotation, 43 A.L.R.2d 831, 834
(1955) (discussing burglary as attack on habitation). Parnell noted that
It is evident that the offense of burglary at common law was considered one aimed
at the security of the habitation rather than against property.... [l]t was the
circumstance of midnight terror aimed toward a man or his family who were in
rightful repose in the sanctuary of the home, that was punished.... [T]he jealousy
with which the law guarded against any infringement of this ancient right of
peaceful habitation is best illustrated by the severe penalties which at common law
were assessed against a person convicted of burglary.
Id. at 834-35.
227. See 2 LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 47, § 8.13, at 464 (stating common-law definition
of burglary (citing 4 W. BLACKmTONE, COMMENTARES ONTHE LAWS OF ENGLAD 224 (1769);
3 E. COKE, INsT um.s OF TBE LAWS OF ENGLAN 63 (1644); 2 E. EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
484 (1803); 1 M. HAL, PLEAs OF THE CROWN 549 (1736))).
228. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 ("Since the felony murder doctrine imputes malice
from the predicate crime, it should be one in which the danger to human life is inherently very
probable."); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 208-09 (stating that common-law
felonies, including burglary, involve danger to life).
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2. Burglary in the Code
a. Statutory Burglary: Section 18.2-89
The Code denominates Title 18.2, Chapter 5, Article 2 as "Burglary and
Related Offenses."'  The first offense in Article 2 is § 18.2-89, "Burglary;
how punished. '"230 Section 18.2-89 is largely a restatement ofthe common-law
offense of burglary."1 Because violation of § 18.2-89 poses an inherently
high risk to human life and because it clearly parallels the common-law
offense of the same name, § 18.2-89 is an appropriate predicate for § 18.2-32
felony murder. 3
2
b. Housebreaking or Storebreaking: Sections 18.2-90 and 18.2-91
The next section in the Code, § 18.2-90,1 3 while now titled "Entering
dwelling house, etc., with intent to commit murder, rape, robbery, or arson,"
229. See VA. CODE ANN. tit 18.2, ch. 5, art. 2 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (listing
statutory offenses under heading "Burglary and Related Offenses").
230. See id. § 18.2-89 (establishing offense of burglary). Section 18.2-89 reads:
If any person break and enter the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with
intent to commit a felony or larceny therein, he shall be guilty of burglary, punish-
able as a Class 3 felony, provided however, that if such person was armed with a
deadly weapon at the time of such entry, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 felony.
Id.
231. See GReOOT, supra note 16, at 71 ("Section 18.2-89 is a restatement of the common
law offense."); supra note 230 (stating elements of § 18-.2-89); supra note 227 and accompany-
ing text (noting elements of common-law burglary). One notable difference is the different
grading for possession of a deadly weapon. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-89 (grading offense of
statutory burglary).
232. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (noting § 18.2-89 is appropriate predicate forfelony
murder).
233. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-90 (establishing housebreaking offense). Section 18.2-90
reads:
If any person in the nighttime enters without breaking or in the daytime breaks and
enters or enters and conceals himself in a dwelling house or an adjoining, occupied
outhouse or in the nighttime enters without breaking or at any time breaks and
enters or enters and conceals himself in any office, shop, manufactured home,
storehouse, warehouse, banking house, church as defined in § 18.2-127, or other
house, or any ship, vessel or river craft or any railroad car, or any automobile, truck
or trailer, if such automobile, truck or trailer is used as a dwelling or place of
human habitation, with intent to commit murder, rape, robbery or arson in violation
of §§ 18.2-77, 18.2-79, or § 18.2-80, he shall be deemed guilty of statutory bur-
glary, which offense shall be a Class 3 felony. However, if such person was armed
with a deadly weapon at the time of such entry, he shall be guilty of a Class 2
felony.
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is often called "housebreaking" or "storebreaking" in the cases3 4 These
denominations also are applied to § 18.2-91, now titled "Entering dwelling
house, etc., with intent to commit larceny, assault and battery or other
felony. 0 35 These two sections differ from burglary in many respects 36 First,
the Code does not limit §§ 18.2-90 and 18.2-91 to nighttime acts. 2 7 Second,
entry may be made without breaking, but by entering and hiding. 8 Third,
§§ 18.2-90 and 18.2-91 extend to structures other than dwelling places, to
include most enclosed structures, ships, railroad cars, and vehicles used as
habitations.239
234. See Willoughby v. Smyth, 194 Va. 267, 270, 72 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1952) (noting
Virginia courts have recognized "housebreaking" and "storebreaking" as descriptive term of
statutory offenses now codified as § 18.2-90 and 18.2-91); see also PERKINs, supra note 62, at
213 (noting that legislatures have enacted statutes in order to expand area of societal interest
protected by common-law burglary, and, to distinguish from common-law felony, often have
labeled statutory offense "housebreaking").
235. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-91 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining burglary
offense). Section 18.2-91 reads:
If any person commits any of the acts mentioned in § 18.2-90 with intent to commit
larceny, or any felony other than murder, rape or robbery, or arson in violation of
§§ 18.2-77,18.2-79, or 18.2-80, or if anyperson commits any ofthe acts mentioned
in § 18.2-89 or § 18.2-90 with intent to commit assault and battery, he shall be
guilty of statutory burglary, punishable by confinement in a state correctional
facility for not less than one or more than twenty years or, in the discretion of the
jury or the court trying the case without a jury, be confined in jail for a period not
exceeding twelve months or fined not more than $2,500, either or both. However,
if the person was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of such entry, he shall be
guilty of a Class 2 felony.
Id.
236. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 71-72 (noting differences between § 18.2-89 burglary
statute and §§ 18.2-90 and 18.2-91).
237. See supra note 233 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-90, includingtime of day require-
ments); supra note 235 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-91, including time of day require-
ments).
238. See supra note 233 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-90, including entry requirements);
supra note 235 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-91, including entry requirements). Sections
18.2-90 and 18.2-91 allow conviction of daytime conduct if done by either (1) entering and
hiding or (2) breaking and entering, only entry must be established for nighttime conduct. See
GROOT, supra note 16, at 72 (explicating statutory language of §§ 18.2-90 and 18.2-91).
239. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 73 (noting that -while burglary can be committed only
against dwelling house, § 18.2-90 "can be committed against a dwelling house or adjoining
outhouse, virtually any other enclosed structure, ship or boat, railroad car, or any motor vehicle
used as a place of habitation"); supra note 233 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-90, including
place requirements). Note that the expansive list of places § 18.2-90 covers includes the
structures enumerated under § 18.2-79, the meeting house burning statute, as well as the non-
structural habitations, such as motor vehicles, of § 18.2-77, the dwelling place statute. See
supra notes 140 & 151 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-77 and 18.2-79); see also Dalton v.
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3. Proper Predicates for Section 18.2-32 Burglary
The differing mental state elements of the Code's "Burglary and Related
Offenses" offers an acceptable means of distinguishing between §§ 18.2-89,
18.2-90, and 18.2-91. Section 18.2-89 requires the intent to commit a felony
or larceny.24 Section 18.2-90 limits its mental state element to the intent to
commit murder, rape, robbery, or arson.24 Similarly, § 18.2-91 limits its
mental state element to the intent to commit larceny, assault and battery, or
felonies other than murder, rape, robbery, or arson.242
Because § 18.2-90's mental state element requires the intent to commit
inherently dangerous offenses, it is an appropriate predicate for felony
murder.243 Although the Code does not limit § 18.2-90 to dwelling places, and
it is therefore not strictly limited to attacks on habitations, breaking and enter-
ing a structure with the intent to commit an inherently dangerous felony
warrants treating § 18.2-90 as § 18.2-89's equivalent for felony murder pur-
poses. 244 The human hazard violation § 18.2-90 creates is actually two-fold:
the improper presence on the premises, whether effected by breaking or con-
cealment, coupled with improper intent to commit a violent felony.24" Notably,
the listed object crimes of § 18.2-90 that are not murder are themselves predi-
cate offenses for felony murder.246
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 544,549,418 S.E2d 563, 565-66 (1992) (stating fact that three
sides of structure were composed of chain link fence does not exclude structure from classifica-
tion as storehouse).
240. See supra note 233 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-90). Note that while common-
law burglary required the intent to commit a felony, § 18.2-89 includes the intent to commit
larceny. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-89. While a felony at common law, see PERKNS, supra note
62, at 234 (defining common-law larceny), the Code divides larceny by kind and degree, and
the offense may not be a felony in some instances. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-95 & 18.2-96
(dividing larceny into grand and petit larceny).
241. See supra note 233 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-90 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999),
including intent requirement).
242. See supra note 235 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-91, including intent requirement).
243. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing doctrinal requirements of felony
murder rule in Virginia).
244. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 274 (stating that "[b]reakinglentering with... [intent
to commit murder, rape, robbery, or arson] carries a sufficiently high inherent risk that a conse-
quent death can properly be treated as felony murder).
245. See id. (stating that "[b]reakingentering with... [intent to commit murder, rape,
robbery, or arson] carries a sufficiently high inherent risk that a consequent death can properly
be treated as felony murder"); supra notes 240-43 (discussing intent elements of §§ 18.2-89 and
18.2-90).
246. See supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting first degree felony murder portion of
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32). A possible exception to this near parallel between the predicate
offenses for felony murder and the object crimes of § 18.2-90 is arson, which the General
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Section 18.2-91 explicitly excepts the specific object crimes of § 18.2-
90.247 Intheirplace, § 18.2-91 names the intent to commit larceny, assault and
battery, or felonies other than those named in § 18.2-90.248 The specific object
crimes of § 18.2-91 do not carry the same level of inherent danger as those in
§ 18.2-90.249 Therefore, § 18.2-91 is an inappropriate predicate for § 18.2-32
burglary felony murder. °
E. Abduction
Abduction and kidnapping are synonymous in the Code."' However,
none of the statutory abduction offenses in the Code correlate directly with
common law kidnapping.1 2 Title 18.2, Chapter 4, Article 3, denominated
"Kidnapping and Related Offenses," contains at least three abduction statutes,
any one of which might be the offense referenced in § 18.2-32.' The cross-
reference in § 18.2-32 to the capital murder statute, "abduction, except as
Assembly added to § 18.2-90 in 1997. See supra note 233 (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-90,
as amended). When the legislature enacted the 1997 amendment, § 18.2-90 incorporated
§§ 18.2-77, 18.2-79, and 18.2-80 as specific object crimes for housebreaking. Id. On their
own, §§ 18.2-79 and 18.2-80 do not pose the level of danger necessary to justifiy their inclusion
as predicate offenses for § 18.2-32. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing
felony murder doctrine). However, when a perpetrator commits those offenses in the context
of violating § 18.2-90, the danger of either §§ 18.2-79 or 18.2-80 is aggravated by the presence
of the additional elements in § 18.2-90. In this context, the burning offense is committed or
attempted inside a structure - after either breaking and entering or entering and concealment
The danger to human life created by the act is multiplied, and the doctrinal requirement that the
predicate offense be inherently dangerous is met. Id.
247. See supra note 235 (quoting VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-91 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999)).
248. See supra note 235 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-91, including intent require-
ment).
249. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (stating "[s]inee the felony murder doctrine imputes
malice from the predicate crime, it should be one in which the danger to human life is inherently
very probable"); 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 47, § 7.5, at 208-09 (stating common-law
felonies, with exception of larceny and consensual sodomy, but especially robbery, arson and
rape, involve danger to life).
250. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 274 & n.113 (stating that lesser intents of § 18.2-91
make it inappropriate to treat death consequent to violation of statute as felony murder but
noting that violation resulting in death is still felony homicide).
251. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (stating that"[t]he terms 'abduction' and 'kidnapping'
shall be synonymous in this Code").
252. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526,323 S.E.2d 572,576 (1984) (stating
§ 18.2-47 supersedes common law); GROOT, supra note 16, at 1 (stating abduction offenses in
Code are "entirely statutory and virtually divorced from their common law antecedents").
253. See VA. CODEANN. tit 18.2, ch. 4, art. 3, §§ 18.2-47, 18.2-48, & 18.2-49.1 (lchie
1996 & Supp. 1999) (listing statutory offenses under Article 3, entitled "Kidnapping and Re-
lated Offenses").
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 561 (2000)
provided in § 18.2-31," adds additional complexity to the determination of the
appropriate abduction predicate. 4
1. Common-Law Abduction and Kidnapping
The common law defined kidnapping as the forcible abduction or stealing
away of man, woman, or child from their own country and sending into an-
other.z" The offense of kidnapping is a form of aggravated false imprison-
ment - with the extreme asportation element of removal from one's native
soil. 6 Simple kidnapping does not require proof of a specific intent."
Aggravated forms include kidnapping for ransom and child stealing." s Al-
though the common law considered kidnapping to be a misdemeanor, modem
statutes make it a felony, and aggravated forms of kidnapping often are in-
cluded in capital statutes."
Abduction, onthe other hand, is not a common-law offense.2"s It has been
a statutory crime, however, since 1487, and originally protected young ladies
of means from immoderate suitors intent on the ladies' inheritances.26 1 The
original statute persists in widely differing forms, butusually includes elements
such as taking, often by force or duress; unlawful purpose, including defile-
ment; and deprivation of lawful custody.262 No single factor inforns modem
abduction statutes beyond the establishment of forms ofpersonal protection;
2 63
254. See supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32, including
capital murder statute reference); supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing capital
statute reference within § 18.2-32 and offering alternative interpretations to "except as provided
in § 18.2-31" phrase); infra Part III.E.3.a (same).
255. See PERKINS, supra note 62, at 176 (stating common-law definition of kidnapping).
256. See id. at 176 & n.2,177 (noting relation of kidnapping to false imprisonment, quoting
East - "kidnapping is the 'most aggravated species of false imprisonment'" - and explaining that
extreme asportation in form of transportation out of country is no longer essential under modem
statutes).
257. See id. at 177 (defining simple kidnapping).
258. See id. at 180, 181 (describing kidnapping for ransom and child stealifg, and noting
that child stealing is sometimes considered form of abduction).
259. See id. at 180 (noting common-law classification of kidnapping as misdemeanor pun-
ishable by fine, imprisonment, and pillory, that modem statutes make kidnapping felony, and
stating "the special form of 'kidnapping for ransom' is regarded as one of the gravest of crimes
and is not infrequently made a capital offense").
260. See id. at 135 (explaining statutory origin of abduction).
261. See id. (noting that statute "provided in substance that if any person should take any
woman. . . against her will, unlawfully, and such woman had substance in the form of lands or
goods or was the heir apparent of her ancestor, such person should be guilty of felony").
262. See id. at 135-38 (describing modem statutory approaches to abduction).
263. See id. at 135 (noting lack of common factor in abduction statutes "other than that
they are intended for certain types of personal protection").
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approaches vary byjurisdiction u" Certain forms of abduction, such as those
prohibiting the deprivation of parental custody, overlap the field of kidnap-
ping.26s As abduction means taking or drawing away, that term logically may
include kidnapping.26
2. Abduction in the Code
a. Simple Abduction: Section 18.2-47
Abduction and kidnapping are synonymous in the Code.267 Title 18.2,
Chapter 4, Article 3, "Kidnapping and Related Offenses," contains two major
categories, simple and aggravated abduction, and five additional statutes
addressed to lesser offenses.2" The first abduction statute in Article 3 is
§ 18.2-47, titled "Abduction and kidnapping defined; punishment." '269 Often
called simple abduction, the cases refer to § 18.2-47 as a lesser-included
offense of the aggravated form codified at § 18.2-48."o Detention without
264. See id. ("One jurisdiction may have only one or two provisions covering a small part
of the total, another may have eight or ten sections with rather exhaustive coverage, while others
occupy intermediate positions of varying degree.").
265. See id. at 135, 181 (noting identity between certain forms of abduction and child
stealing kidnapping).
266. Se i at 136 (noting that word abduction was employed by Blackstone in his defimi-
tion of kidnapping, and "could logically have included that field as well").
267. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (Mlchie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (stating that "tihe terms
'abduction' and 'kidnapping' shall be synonymous in this Code"); see also PERKINS, supra note
62, at 181 (noting connections between forms of abduction and kidnapping, various statutory
approaches to those offenses, and stating "[o]ne rather logical solution is a chapter on abduction
and kidnapping").
268. See VA. CODEANN. tit 18.2, ch. 4, art. 3 (listing abduction offenses). Section18.2-47
is the simple abduction statute. See infra note 269 (quoting simple abduction offense). Section
18.248 is the aggravated abduction statute. See infa note 277 (quoting aggravated abduction
offense). The additional statutes are: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-48.1 (abduction by prisoners);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-49 (threatening, attempting or assisting in abduction); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.249 (parental abduction in violation of court order); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-50 (requiring
disclosure of information and assistance to law enforcement by immediate family); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-50.2 (providing emergency control of telephone service in hostage situation).
269. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2.47 (defining abduction offense). Section 18.2-47 reads,
in pertinent part:
Any person, who, by force, intimidation or deception, and without legal justifica-
tion or excuse, seizes, takes, transports, detains or secretes the person of another,
with the intent to deprive such other person of his personal liberty or to withhold
or conceal him from any person, authority or institution lawfully entitled to his
charge, shall be deemed guilty of 'abduction' .... [T]he terms 'abduction' and
'kidnapping' shall be synonymous in this Code.
Id.
270. See Hawks v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 244,247,321 S.E.2d 650,652 (1984) (stating
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asportation violates § 18.2-47Y 1 The deprivation of liberty may be accom-
plished by deception and not force.272 Unless the abduction fits into an explicit
category, like parental abduction, violation of § 18.2-47 is punishable as a
Class 5 felony.
2 71
Parents violate § 18.2-47 by detaining, secreting or taking their own
children in violation of a custody decree.274 A violation may occur if the
abducting parent is without or has limited custodial or visitation rights and that
parent withholds the child beyond the scope of the custody decree.2 71 If the
child is withheld in Virginia, the abducting parent is guilty of a Class 1 misde-
meanor; if the parent removes the child from the Commonwealth, the offense
is a Class 6 felony.276
b. Aggravated Abduction: Section 18.2-48
The Code titles § 18.2-48 "Abduction with intent to extort money or
for immoral purpose."277 Section 18.2-48 consists of the same elements as
the lesser-included § 18.2-47 plus an additional mental state." To convict
under § 18.2-48, the Commonwealth must prove that the abduction was com-
mitted to extort money or for pecuniary benefit, to defile the victim, or, if
the victim is under sixteen, for the purpose of concubinage or prostitu-
that § 18.2-47 is "an offense lesser-included in the offense defined in § 18.2-48"); GROOT, supra
note 16, at 1 (describing § 18.2-47 as simple abduction).
271. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310, 314, 337 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1985)
(concluding that § 18.2-47 may be violated by detention without asportation); GROOT, supra
note 16, at 1-2 (noting that § 18.2-47 prohibition on seizure, detention, and secreting does not
necessarily involve movement, and that abduction crime is complete when victim is deceptively
detained).
272. See supra note 269 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47, including force, intimidation
or deception element).
273. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining abduction
offense and providing punishment for offense).
274. See supra note 269 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47, including provision forbid-
ding withholding from one "lawfully entitled to [a child's] charge").
275. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 3-4 (describing possible custodial violations of § 18.2-
47, and noting that abducting parent must intend to withhold child from custodial parent).
276. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47 (defining simple abduction and providing penalty for
offense). Note that if the child is withheld in the Commonwealth, an unintended death in the
course of such an abduction could not serve as a predicate for felony homicide, whereas death
after removal from the Commonwealth might See id. § 18.2-33 (defining felony homicide).
277. See id. § 18.2-48 (defining aggravated abduction). Section 18.2-48 reads: "Abduc-
tion (i) with the intent to extort money, or pecuniary benefit, (ii) of any person with intent to
defile such person, or (iii) of any child under sixteen years of age for the purpose of concubi-
nage or prostitution, shall be a Class 2 felony." Id.
278. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 5 (noting that § 18.2-48 consists of simple abduction
plus additional mental state).
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tion.279 The Code punishes an abduction committed with any of these mental
states as a Class 2 felony."0
The pecuniary benefit/extortion mental state clearly encompasses ransom
kidnapping.2 1 However, the courts have interpreted the statute to reach a
wide variety of fact situations, including cases in which the object of the
abduction is to collect or to cancel a debt or even to get a free ride.' Of
course, an abduction committed in the course of a robbery qualifies as an
abduction committed with the intent to extort money or pecuniary benefit. 3
The victim ofa defilement abduction maybe either male or female. 4 The
intent to defile is a specific intent that the Commonwealth must establish." s
The Code does not define "defile."" 5 Although defilement is not so limited a
concept, the reported cases all involve rape or sodomy. 7 Similarly, the Code
279. See supra note 277 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-48 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999),
including mental state element).
280. See supra note 277 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-48, including grade of offense).
281. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 5 ("Traditional ransom kidnapping is no doubt the
primary evil against which this part of the statute is directed."); see also PERKNS, supra note
62, at 180 (stating "the special form of 'kidnapping for ransom' is regarded as one of the gravest
of crimes and is not infrequently made a capital offense").
282. See Tumbull v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 328, 332, 218 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1975)
(finding abduction with intent to collect debt within pecuniary benefit element of aggravated
abduction statute); Krummert v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 581,585,43 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1947)
(finding abduction with intent to obtain free ride within pecuniary benefit element of aggravated
abduction); Kent v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 840, 841-42, 183 S.E. 177, 177-78 (1936)
(finding abduction with intent to obtain cancellation of debt within pecuniary benefit element
of aggravated abduction statute); GROOT, supra note 16, at 5 (noting broad construction given
mental state requirement of§ 18.2-48).
283. See Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 137, 360 S.E.2d 196, 201 (1987)
(holding robbery abduction within § 18.2-48); GROOT, supra note 16, at 5 (noting robbery
abductionwithin § 18.2-48).
284. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 5 & n.32 (noting § 18.2-48 uses language "any person"
for victim of defilement abduction).
285. See id. at 5 (noting specific intent element of § 18.2-48).
286. See id. at 5 & n.33 (noting that Code does not define defilement, but that model in-
structions substitute term "sexually molest" for "defile," and that substitution has been judicially
approved (citing Va. Model Crim. Instr. No. 4.200, and Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va.
615,633,292 S.E.2d 798, 808 (1982))).
287. See id. at 5 (noting defilement in reported case, and arguing term "defile" should
include rape, carnal knowledge, sodomy and object sexual penetration). Notably, with the
exception of carnal knowledge, this definition of defilement lists the sex offense predicates in
§ 18.2-32. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing felony murder statute and
predicate offenses). Carnal knowledge, criminalized by §§ 18.2-63 and 18.2-64.1, is defined as
sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, annalingus, anal intercourse, and object sexual penetra-
tion, see VA. CoDEANN. §§ 18.2-63(ii), 18.2-64.1 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining carnal
knowledge for purposes of sections), and remains within the ambit of the sex offenses in § 18.2-
32. See supra Part liA (discussing sex offenses of rape, forcible sodomy, and object sexual
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does not define concubinage, and it presumably means holding the victim for
repetitive sexual gratification of the abductor.'
c. Parental Abduction: Section 18.2-49.1
In addition to the parental abduction subdivision of § 18.2-47, the Code
includes a separate statute for violations of court orders regarding custody and
visitation.29 Section 18.2-49.1 criminalizes the knowing, wrongful, and inten-
tional withholding of a child in violation of a custody or visitation decree.' g
The violation of the court order must be "clear and significant."1291
3. Proper Predicates for Section 18.2-32 Abduction
a. History of the Cross-Reference to Section 18.2-31
The language of § 18.2-32 provides additional but inconclusive guidance
for interpreting the scope of the abduction reference. Following a listing of
the predicate offenses, the language of § 18.2-32 reads "except as provided in
§ 18.2-31 .' 292 Facially, the exception could apply to all three clauses of
§ 18.2-32 - the specific means, the willful and deliberate, and the felony
murder categories; to all the predicate offenses to felony murder; or to only
the predicate offense immediately preceding the clause, abduction.'
penetration); supra note 86 (discussing penetration in context of sex offenses and doctrinal
requirement ofinherent dangerousness).
288. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 6 (explaining concubinage as holding victim for repeti-
tive sexual gratification of abductor).
289. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-47 & 18.2-49.1 (Miehie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (defining
parental abduction offenses).
290. See id. § 18.2-49.1 (defining parental abduction offense). Section 18.2-49.1 reads:
A. Any person who knowingly, wrongfully and intentionally withholds a child
from the child's custodial parent in a clear and significant violation of a court order
respecting the custody or visitation of such child, provided such child is withheld
outside of the Commonwealth, shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
B. Any person who knowingly, wrongfully and intentionally engages in conduct
which constitutes a clear and significant violation of a court order respecting the
custody or visitation of a child shall be guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor upon
conviction of a first offense. A second conviction for a violation of this section
within twelve months of a first conviction shall be a Class 3 misdemeanor, and a
third conviction occurring within twenty-four months of the first conviction shall
be a Class 2 misdemeanor.
Id.
291. Id.; see GROOT, supra note 16, at4 (noting that "clear and significant" language seems
to permit proffer of defensive evidence negating element).
292. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32).
293. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing structure of first degree murder
statute); supra Part I.B (discussing § 182-31 cross-reference).
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The statutory history supports this last reading. 4 Prior to 1962, abduc-
tion was not a predicate offense for first degree felony murder.' g In 1962, the
General Assembly added "abduction as defined in § 18.2-38" to the list of
predicate felonies. 6 Section 18.2-38 was virtually identical to present § 18.2-
48, the aggravated abduction statute.2"
In 1975, the General Assembly added § 18.2-31, the capital murder
statute, to the Code.' At the time of its enactment, § 18.2-31 included only
one form of capital felony murder: "[i]n the commission of abduction, as
defined in § 18.2-48, when such abduction was committed with the intent to
extort money, or a pecuniary benefit."'  Thus, while abductions to extort
money or pecuniary benefit became capital felony murder predicates, the other
forms of § 18.2-48, abduction with intent to defile or for purposes of prostitu-
tion, did not.300 At this time the General Assembly also amended the language
of the first degree murder statute to read, as it does now, "abduction, except
as provided in § 18.2-31.1131
These amendments firmly clarified the scope of the capital felony murder
predicate of abduction, but they made the first degree felony murder predicate
less clear. Two different readings now are possible. One interpretation could
be that as abductions to extort money or for pecuniary benefit were elevated
to capital felony murder predicates, the other forms of § 18.2-48 abduction not
included in § 18.2-31, defilement and prostitution abduction, became the only
294. See infra notes 295-301 and accompanying text (examining statutory history). Alter-
native readings are possible. All of the felonies listed in § 18.2-32, with the exception of arson,
also are referenced in § 18.2-31. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-32 (listing predicate
offenses for capital and first degree felony murder). Arguably, the phrase "except as provided
in § 18.2-31" could apply to all of the felonies in § 18.2-32. This reading would not resolve the
question, however, of whether § 18.2-47 abductions are predicate felonies under § 18.2-32, and
does not comport with the legislative history. See infra notes 295-301 and accompanying text
(discussing amendments to §§ 18.2-31 and 18.2-32).
295. See 1962 Va. Acts ch. 42 (adding abduction as predicate offense for first degree
felony murder).
296. Id.
297. See 1960 Va. Acts ch. 358 (amending § 18.2-38, aggravated abduction statute); supra
note 277 (quoting VA. CoDBANN. § 18.2-48 (Mlchie 1996 & Supp. 1999), current aggravated
abduction statute). At the time, the simple abduction statute was § 18.2-36, the equivalent to
the current § 18.2-47. See 1960 Va. Acts ch. 358 (amending § 18.2-36, simple abduction
statute); supra note 269 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47, current simple abduction statute).
298. See 1975 Va. Acts chs. 14, 15 (enacting capital murder statute).
299. See id. (enacting capital murder statute). The General Assembly also moved the
aggravated abduction statute from § 18.2-38 to its current place in the Code, § 18.2-48. See id.
(denominating aggravated abduction statute as § 18.2-48).
300. See supra note 277 (quoting § 18.248, aggravated abduction statute); supra note 281
(discussing egregious nature of ransom kidnapping).
301. See 1975 Va. Acts chs. 14, 15 (enacting capital murder statute and amending first
degree murder statute).
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predicates for first degree felony murder." 2 This interpretation is consistent
with the prior treatment of first degree felony murder predicates, and it draws
on the language of the statute prior to the 1975 amendment, when the first
degree murder statute explicitly limited the abduction predicate to § 18.2-38
aggravated abductions.
303
A competing interpretation, based primarily on the statutory language of
§ 18.2-32, reaches dramatically different results. This interpretation reads
"abduction, except as provided in § 18.2-31" to mean all abductions not
named in § 18.2-31: that is, all other abduction offenses in the Code, to
include § 18.2-48 forms not found in § 18.2-31, as well as § 18.247 simple
abductions."' At its most extreme, this literal reading of the statutory lan-
guage includes even § 18.2-49.1 parental abductions .3 " An inquiry into the
penalty structures of the abduction offenses provides a basis for choosing
between these two interpretations.
b. Penalty Structure
In 1997, the General Assembly split § 18.2-47 into subdivisions. °
Section 18.2-47A is the simple abduction provision and is a Class 5 felony."°
Section 18.2-47B defines two types of parental abductions, one of which is a
Class 6 felony, the other a Class 1 misdemeanor °.30 As a result, incorporation
of § 18.2-47 into the predicate offense of abduction in § 18.2-32 necessarily
includes potential misdemeanors. 3 ' Even if restricted to the simple abduction
302. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, 18.2-32 (establishing predicate offenses for capital
and first degree felony murder). In 1985, the General Assembly amended § 182-31 to include
willful, deliberate and premeditated killings of children under 12 in the commission of an
abduction with the intent to defile the victim. See 1985 Va. Acts ch. 428 (amending capital
murder statute to include subdivision (h)). In 1996, § 18.2-31 -was amended to include abduc-
tions committed with the intent to defile the victim, regardless of age. See 1996 Va. Acts ch.
876,959 (amending subdivisions (1) and (8) of capital murder statute). Thus, the only § 18.2-48
abduction not included as a capital murder predicate is prostitution abduction. See VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-31,18.2-48 (defining capital murder and aggravated abduction, respectively).
303. See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text (discussing history of abduction
predicate for first degree felony murder).
304. See supra notes 269,277 (quoting simple and aggravated abduction statutes).
305. See supra note 290 (quoting parental abduction statute).
306. See 1997 Va. Acts ch. 747 (amending § 18.2-47 by splitting into subdivisions).
307. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47A (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (establishing simple
abduction offense); supra Part MlE.2.a (examining simple abduction statute).
308. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47B (establishing form of parental abduction); supra Part
IILE.2.a (examining § 18.2-47 parental abduction).
309. This is a clearly undesirable consequence. Misdemeanors are inappropriate predicates
for felony murder. The solution to the problem, should one deem simple abduction offenses to
be appropriately within the scope of the § 18.2-32 abduction reference, is rather messy. The
General Assembly might refer, in § 18.2-32, to only those forms of § 18.2-47 that fit, that is,
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provision, § 18.2-47A, the abduction predicate would include offenses punish-
able at their maximum by imprisonment for ten years and at minimum by less
than twelve months confinement."'
By comparison, the Code categorizes § 18.2-48 as a Class 2 felony. At
their maximum, Class 2 felonies are punishable by imprisonment for life and,
at minimum, twenty years. 311 This level of punishment reflects the aggravated
nature of the offense, and is consistent with the levels of punishment indicated
by other first degree felony murder predicates. 12
Because inclusion of §§ 18.2-47 and 18.2-49.1 within the scope of
§ 18.2-32's abduction reference produces the undesirable result of making
misdemeanors predicate offenses for first degree felony murder, the reference
should explicitly be limited to § 18.2-48 abductions not included in § 18.2-31.
Arguably, the legislature intended this result when it amended §§ 18.2-31 and
18.2-32 in 1975. 313 Limiting the § 18.2-32 abduction predicate to § 18.2-48
abductions is consistent with the felony murder rule's doctrinal requirement
that predicate offenses should be limited to the most serious felonies. 4
Limiting the § 18.2-32 abduction predicate to § 18.2-48 avoids the potential
need to differentiate between §§ 18.2-47A and 18.2-47B abductions.315 The
penalty provision for § 18.2-48, unlike §§ 18.2-47 and 18.2-49.1, also is con-
sistent with the penalty structures of the other clearly ascertainable predicates
within § 18.2-3216
§ 18.2-47A abductions. Alternatively, the legislature could create two statutes out of the already
subdivided § 18.2-47. However, this option might require a reassessment of the other parental
abduction statute, § 18.2-49.1. See supra note 269 (quoting simple abduction statute); supra
Part I[LE.2.c (discussing § 18.2-49.1 parental abduction).
310. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(e) (establishing punishment for conviction of Class 5
felony); supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of Class 5 and 6
felonies as predicates for first degree felony murder); supra note 62 and accompanying text
(discussing felony murder doctrine and requirement of serious threat to life or inherent danger-
ousness).
311. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(b) (establishing punishment for conviction of Class 2
felony).
312. See id. §§ 18.2-61, 18.2-67.1, 18.2-67.2 & 18.2-58 (stating maximum penalty for
rape, forcible sodomy, object sexual penetration, and robbery, respectively, as life imprison-
ment).
313. See supra Part ]I.E.3.a. (discussing potential interpretations of "abduction, except
as provided in § 18.2-31" language of§ 18.2-32).
314. See GROOT, supra note 16, at 273 (stating that § 18.2-47 "does not import harm to the
victim"); supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing felony murder doctrine and require-
ment of serious threat to life or inherent dangerousness).
315. See supra note 309 (discussing possible solutions to reference problem caused by split
in § 18.2-47).
316. See supra note 312 (noting maximum penalties for rape, forcible sodomy, object sex-
ual penetration, and robbery statutes).
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IV Conclusion
The current reference system in § 18.2-32 for first degree felony murder
contains too many ambiguities to properly serve its purpose.31 The knotty
statutory tangle consists of many strands: inconsistent relationships between
statutory offenses and their Code headings;318 a confusing cross-reference to
the capital murder statute; 319 a combination of common-law and statutory
predicate offenses; 320 and legislative amendments to the felony murder statute,
the capital murder statute, and the underlying predicate offense sections. 2'
The solution, however, is relatively simple.
Denominating predicate offenses by their statutory section number within
the text of § 18.2-32 would eliminate the undesirable ambiguity inherent in the
Code's current reference system.3 ' The statutory section of each predicate
should be parenthetically placed after the offense as named in § 18.2-32. 3z
The Code utilizes this level of precision in other areas, notably in the capital
felony murder abduction reference.324 Scrutiny of the felony murder doctrine
317. See supra Part I.C (explaining function of statutory felony murder).
318. See supra Part IILB (discussing discontinuities between Article heading and common-
law offense of robbery).
319. See supra Part M.E.3.a (discussing § 18.2-32's cross-reference to § 18.2-31).
320. See supra Part IIB (discussing common-law offense of robbery).
321. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing notable amendments to relevant
Code provisions).
322. A model amendment to § 18.2-32, proposed by Professor Roger D. Groot, reads as
follows:
§ 18.2-32. First and second degree murder defined: punishment. -
Murder, other than capital murder, by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving,
or by any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or in the commission of or
attempt to commit arson (§ 18.2-77), rape (§ 18.2-61), forcible sodomy (§ 18.2-
67.1), object sexual penetration (§ 18.2-67.2), common law robbery, burglary
(§ 18.2-89) or abduction (§ 18.2-48), is murder of the first degree, punishable as
a Class 2 felony.
All murder other than capital murder and murder in the first degree is murder of the
second degree and is punishable by confinement in a state correctional facility for
not less than nor more than forty years.
Memorandum from Professor Roger Groot, Washington and Lee School of Law, to Jim Walsh
(October 22, 1997) (on file with author). Possible alterations to this model might include the
addition of§ 18.2-58.1 as a robbery predicate and § 18.2-90 as a burglary predicate. See supra
Part II.B.3, IlI.D.3 (discussing proper predicates for § 18.2-32 robbery and burglary predicates).
323. See supra note 322 (providing model revision for felony murder statute).
324. See VA. CoDEANN. § 18.2-31(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999) (citing VA. CODEANN.
§ 18.2-48 in capital felony murder abduction subsection); id. § 18.2-91 (citing VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.2-89, 18.2-90 in burglary offense); see also supra notes 89-92 (discussing history of
modifications to capital and felony murder statutes and effect on scope of predicate offense of
object sexual penetration).
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in Virginia' and the range of potential predicates for the § 18.2-32 refer-
ences... reveals that the obvious candidates tend to be inherently dangerous
offenses and are, for the most part, easily identified.32
The scope of the predicate offense, however, should be apparent from the
face of the statute." It should not require an inquiry into the doctrinal under-
pinnings of the felony murder rule to rationalize the result.3 9 This ambiguity
runs contrary to the basic purpose of statutory codification and erects analyti-
cal barriers to citizens without legal training. The possibility of starkly
inequitable results also argues for the modification of § 18.2-32's reference
system for predicate offenses for first degree felony murder.3 ' As it stands
now, however, the Code does not determine the scope of first degree felony
murder by statute; this determination is left to prosecutors and, ultimately, to
the courts.
325. See supra Part IlIB (examining felony murder doctrine in Virginia).
326. See supra Part Il (examining potential predicates for first degree felony murder).
327. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing felony murder rule's doctrinal
requirement of inherent dangerousness). It is also important to note here that felony offenses
that are not inherently dangerous, and that have not been included in the proposed revision to
§ 18.2-32, are still chargeable as § 18.2-33 felony homicides. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-33
(defining offense of felony homicide). Policy disputes about the scope of predicate offenses
under § 18.2-32 should be resolved with this factor in mind.
328. See Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 7, 16, 402 S.E.2d 229, 234 (1991)
(noting penal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to define offense "with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" (quoting Kolender v. Law-
son, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983))); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing
codification of criminal law and requirement of notice).
329. See Perkins, 402 S.E.2d at 234 (noting requirement that law "give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited" (quoting Coleman
v. City of Richmond, 5 Va. App. 459,466,364 S.E.2d 239 (1988) (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108-09 (1972)))).
330. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing potential for first degree felony
murder conviction predicated on parental abduction); supra Part ILC.3 (discussing existence
of potential arson predicate offense with mental state element of negligence); supra Part III.D.3
(discussing inappropriateness of potential burglary predicate offense with insufficient mental
state element); supra Part ]ILE.3.b (discussing classification of some abduction offenses as
misdemeanors).

